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ABSTRACT 
 
The evolution of the Pasdaran over the past thirty years has brought the group further 
away from its original role as a protector of the revolution and closer to a parallel, if not 
competing, economic, political and social institution.  In the last decade, conflict dominating the 
political landscape of the Islamic Republic of Iran has shifted from being defined primarily by 
the Reformists (Islamic Left) and the Conservatives (Islamic Right), to a multi-dimensional 
struggle between the Reformists, Conservatives, and Neo-Conservatives, represented by the 
IRGC and President Ahmadinejad.  The IRGC‘s defiance against the authority of the clerics, 
evidenced by President Ahmadinejad‘s deteriorating relationship with the Supreme Leader, is an 
indication of a shift in the sources of influence in domestic and foreign policy making and the 
necessary attempts of the ruling regime to compensate for its loss of control.  It appears that the 
IRGC may be in a position to seriously challenge the authority of the clerics; however, this 
research hypothesizes that as the organization has evolved parallel to the velayet-e faqih, it does 
not have the necessary autonomy or cohesion to effectively usurp the rule of the clerics.  This 
study proposes that the competitive disunity that has propelled the growth of the IRGC over the 
past three decades is prohibitive of the collective consolidation of influence necessary to wrest 
authority from the clerical regime.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
On October 11
th
, 2011, the United States released information revealing a plot by an Iran-
born US citizen to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States.  The report 
detailed the objectives of the man and his coconspirators, belonging to an organization known as 
the Quds Force, and immediately unleashed a frenzy of speculation about the role of the Iranian 
government in the plot.  The Quds Force, a branch of Iran‘s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
is known to operate abroad in covert missions to promote the interests of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.
1
  The Quds Forces commander, Qassem Suleimani, reports directly to Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei, leading reporters and analysts to question whether the Iranian government 
had a direct role in the failed plot on the life of the Saudi Ambassador.
2
  In order to address the 
question, it would be necessary to determine whether the IRGC and the Quds Forces operate 
independently of the central government.  Where in Iran‘s complex bureaucracy and executive 
political structure does power originate?  Speculation about the longevity of the clerical regime 
has naturally followed this question; if the IRGC and the Quds Forces were indeed able to plot 
the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador without the approval of the chief executive, the 
Supreme Leader, does it follow that the IRGC has the resources and legitimacy to usurp the 
clerical authority in Iran?  
 
Thesis Statement 
Contemporary analysts describe the ascension of the IRGC and the expansion of its 
economic and political influence as a silent, or masquerade, coup.
3
  In an interview following the 
revelation of the IRGC plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador, noted analyst Fareed Zakaria 
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stated that what we are seeing is essentially a military takeover of the regime by the IRGC.
4
   The 
statement is debatable, but the evolution of the organization over the past three decades has 
indeed brought it further away from its origins as a protector of the revolution and closer to a 
parallel, if not competing, economic, political and social establishment.  This evolution occurred 
in stages which began with its overshadowing the Artesh, the state military, in the 1980s, the 
growth of its economic ventures and monopoly of reconstruction efforts in the 1990s, and the 
challenge to both the Islamic Left and Islamic Right political groups beginning in 2003.  In the 
last decade, conflict dominating the political landscape of the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
shifted from being defined by the Reformists (Islamic Left) and the Conservatives (Islamic 
Right), to a multidimensional struggle between the Reformists, represented by Mehdi Karrubi 
and Muhammad Khatami; Principalists, represented by the clerics and the Supreme leader; and 
Neoconservatives, represented by the IRGC, President Ahmadinejad, and his Chief of Staff, 
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.
5
   The belligerence displayed between all three political institutions in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is an indication of a shift in the sources of influence in domestic and 
foreign policy making and the necessary attempts of the ruling regime to compensate for its own 
loss of control.
6
  
 
Significance 
As the report of the assassination plot has illustrated, the operations of the IRGC outside 
of the borders of Iran are of great significance to the global diplomatic community.  The Islamic 
Republic of Iran‘s constitution allows the IRGC a broad interpretation of its foreign policy 
mandate and the organization has chosen from the outset to utilize its resources and influence at 
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home and abroad to further the goals of the establishment.
 7
  While those objectives vary 
depending on the dominant actors within the IRGC, they consistently involve the ideological and 
material support of the enemies of the West.  As will be discussed in further detail in this 
research, the goals and interests of the IRGC differ, but the Quds Forces that represent the 
foreign operations wing of the Pasdaran have left no doubt as to their foreign allegiances.  The 
IRGC directly and indirectly supports terrorist and militant groups and therefore it is vitally 
important for the United States to take note of the Guard‘s foreign operation as well as their 
domestic activities.
8
   
Iran‘s foreign and domestic interests are multidimensional and are influenced at a very 
deep level by conflicting institutional and individual interests.  This is a feature that defines the 
politics within conservative, neoconservative, reformist and various other political factions.  The 
conflict is epitomized in the combative relationship between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which culminated in 2011 with President 
Ahmadinejad boycotting cabinet meetings for almost two weeks.
9
  The Supreme Leader and 
President Ahmadinejad represent competing associations, each seeking to manipulate the 
political and ideological trajectory of the country in their own favor.  At the frontline of the 
rivalry between neoconservative and conservative interests is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps.   
Iranian political and social institutions have evolved over the past thirty years into the 
contemporary structure which is lacking of a distinct center of power.  The necessity for a proper 
understanding of this trait of Iranian social and political landscape cannot be overemphasized; 
Western diplomats are arguably justified in their concerns with regard to the nuclear ambitions of 
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the Islamic Republic of Iran, but a persistent simplistic analysis of the source of power in Iran 
could potentially lead to impotent measures of reproof.  Accumulating economic sanctions, for 
example, could strengthen the Pasdaran by increasing demand for black market goods that 
various factions of the group provide, leading to a disproportionate growth of influence and the 
destabilization of the status quo.  What has been called a ―velvet revolution‖ could yet become a 
violent revolution.
10
  
 
Hypothesis 
Research Question and Variables 
Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear capabilities and substandard 2009 presidential elections brought 
a resurgence of public interest in the United States‘ foreign policy towards the nation, leading to 
a rise in demand for hard facts and data that can explain the sources of leadership and political 
control in the Islamic Republic.  The constant theme in existing analyses is the search for a 
center of power in Iranian politics.  Scholars and analysts debate, based on evidence from 
government reports, local and international media and individual testimonies coming from 
Iranians themselves, over whether the theocratic rule which dominated domestic and foreign 
policy in Iran following the Revolution is potentially being challenged by the rise of the 
praetorian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
11
  The dispute is divided along a spectrum of 
beliefs ranging from those who maintain that the Islamic Republic, including the IRGC, is 
controlled almost exclusively by the theocratic regime and those who believe that the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leverages its economic and social influence to control nearly 
all aspects of domestic and foreign policy.  The aim of this research is to qualitatively measure 
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the influence of the IRGC and the degree of autonomy that it has from the clerical regime by 
studying the evolution of the Guards and the role that individuals, business and groups within the 
association play in public policy, economy, defense and society. 
 
Internal conflict in Iranian politics is evidenced in media reports beginning in 2009; the 
best example perhaps coming from the unconcealed hostility between Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad.  Iran is facing a shift in sources of political influence but 
the trajectory of this change is not headed towards a center of power; rather, it is being re-
diversified among the various political factions, many of which exist under the umbrella of the 
association of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  This study makes the argument that, 
while the IRGC does hold a significant degree of legitimacy and autonomy in Iranian domestic 
and foreign policy making, it does not possess the organizational infrastructure or political 
homogeneity necessary to organize a coup against the clerics.  In this study, the autonomy, 
legitimacy and unity of the IRGC are measured in material, financial and social capital.   
The factional divisiveness and decentralization of power in the IRGC contributes to its 
effectiveness as an organization and the Guards‘ rate of growth over the years can be attributed 
to this competitive disunity.  However, the factional nature of the IRGC that has catalyzed the 
growth of the group‘s influence over the past three decades is prohibitive of consolidating 
influence to unseat the clerical regime. The IRGC holds vast amounts of influence in the form of 
economic and military leverage; however, the organization‘s political factions are not cohesive 
in their ideology, policy or constituency base.  As factionalized as the Guards are politically, they 
are unable to unify their social capital in order to gain the autonomy necessary to successfully 
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run the Islamic Republic.  IRGC‘s longevity is more likely to be guaranteed in the status quo 
system in which the organization exercises its political influence through the economic and 
military means available to it instead of seeking control of the executive branch of government.   
 
Research Design 
The scope of the material covered in this research will be limited to the study of 
interactions between the neoconservative IRGC and the conservative Clerical regime.  This does 
not suggest that Iranian foreign and domestic policy making is bipolar in nature; many other 
existing institutions in Iran compete regularly in the political arena.  In studying the distribution 
of power between the two major political institutions, this study will compare the political, 
social, economic and military leverage of each group as mediating or fundamental mechanisms 
affecting the balance of power.  These variables will be examined through the longitudinal 
analysis of the evolution of the clerical regime and the IRGC as both demonstrate themselves to 
be complex and adaptable.     
This study will conclude with a qualitative analysis based on the collective variables to 
support the hypothesis that the IRGC does not possess significant cohesion as an institution to 
pose a unified threat to velayet-e faqih.  As this study is qualitative in nature, data will be 
gathered from a wide variety of sources including but not limited to industry and politics 
journals, existing published books, local and international periodicals. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) necessitates an 
understanding of the development, evolution and function of the institution as both an 
autonomous and a socially conditioned entity.  Institutional theories have been present in the 
study of political science for centuries, with more recent theories of new institutionalism 
emerging at the turn of the century. The perspectives and emphases of each paradigm of thought 
vary greatly to the point of being overly complex in the pragmatic interpretation of the actual 
case studies.  It is for this reason that the following chapters examining the IRGC as an 
association of interests will attempt to incorporate all understandings of the nature of the 
organization.  We must, nevertheless, tread briefly into theoretical territory for the purpose of 
explaining the need to study the institutional nature of the IRGC above theoretical bias.   
The objective study of institutionalism has at its foundation the basic understanding that 
social and political life is modeled not only on the aggregated actions and worldviews of 
individuals, but by institutions as well.
12
  It stands to reason, therefore, that institutions play a 
key role in defining the direction of a political system as it evolves over time.  While no 
individual event or decision can be the sole causal mechanism resulting in the contemporary 
political structure of any one state, it is an intriguing exercise nonetheless to study the evolution 
of a nation state through the lens of institutional influence.  Institutions evolve in a variety of 
ways, some through bold policy making and abrupt change and others through gradual growth of 
influence.  Most institutional theorists maintain that institutions emerge as a by-product of 
competition for influence, acting as a solution to social and political conflict and developing in 
the context of struggle for power.
13
  Though this conflict visibly influences the development of 
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the institutions themselves, it more importantly shapes the evolution of the political system in 
which they function.   
The following chapters on the sources of influence within the IRGC illustrate the 
evolution of the group from a policy enforcing organization to one that directly influences the 
politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The study will be conducted through a historical 
analysis of the three decades of domestic policy following the Revolution of 1979 as well as the 
IRGC‘s mandate to export the Revolution abroad and will investigate the different approaches 
that the institution has used to realize their various interests. This study will examine the role of 
the IRGC in three different potential positions of influence with the objective of demonstrating 
that the organization has emerged in recent decades from a position of enforcing the policy of the 
bureaucratic state to a position of not only influencing, but directing policy making.    
One of the new Islamic regime‘s immediate priorities following the return of Ayatollah 
Khomeini to Iran in 1979 was the abolition of former institutions that reflected the detested 
monarchic tyranny and the consolidation of social, economic and political groups that would 
support the Islamic State and the rule of the clerics.  It was in this post-conflict climate that the 
IRGC was created as a policy implementing organization, tasked with maintaining the 
bureaucratic and judicial infrastructure to enforce compliance with policies made by other 
institutions within the state.  Over the years the IRGC grew not only in membership, but in 
economic and military strength, evolving into a policy influencing organization as it influenced 
which issues are brought to the attention of policy makers, guided the means of implementation, 
and provided recommendations for the creation or modification of policies.
14
  Of increasing 
concern to US foreign policy makers and diplomats has been the development of the IRGC over 
 9 
 
the past ten years into what appears to be a policy-making association; one that formulates state 
policies through formal and informal channels and interprets existing and developing policies, 
setting the precedence for implementation.
15
  As the following chapters examine the thirty years 
following the Revolution, the IRGC will be examined in the context of its policy interests, 
capabilities for policy enforcement or making, and the tangible influence as the product of the 
interests and capabilities of the organization.   
 
Literature Review 
Existing literature on the politics, society and economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
far from lacking.  The 1979 Revolution threw Iran into the West‘s foreign policy spotlight and 
also brought an abundance of exiles and immigrants from the country, carrying with them an 
understanding of the IRI that few could rival with second hand knowledge.  Scholars and 
journalists that study Iranian politics traditionally focus on the clerical regime.  Media and 
publications up until about 2005 had been mostly concerned with understanding the influence of 
the Supreme Leader and clerics on the country and many of these perspectives carry the 
assumption that the division in politics fell simply along the lines of conservatives vs. reformists.  
Today, literature is struggling to catch up to the change in the leadership dynamics of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  As mentioned, this is largely the result of a lack of access to information 
coming from the centers of power themselves; research, therefore, is unavoidably superficial.   
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Institutional Change 
Institutional theory is not a unified body of thought; rather, it is a foundation from which 
scholars of a variety of disciplines, including sociology, politics and economics, have studied the 
influencing mechanisms in the development, evolution, influence and products of institutions.  In 
the study of the IRGC, a basic understanding of institutional theory is mandatory as there are 
many options for the direction of analysis of the organization‘s growth and influence in Iran.   
The study of institutional change goes back centuries and has its roots in sociology and 
economics.  Max Weber is the father of political institutional theory and laid the foundation for 
the study in his early research on the influence of bureaucratization on institutional change.  In 
recent decades there has been a new trend in institutional theory termed ―new institutionalism‖.  
New Institutionalism is no more cohesive than its predecessor; within the body of thought there 
are three parallel assumptions that differ from one another and have caused a split in the 
theoretical development of institutionalism, resulting in separate schools of thought.  These three 
schools are historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism.    
In brief, historical institutionalism developed within the field of political science and the 
body of thought studies the institutional organization as a function of the political economy and 
as a principle actor influencing political behavior.
16
  Scholars of International Relations theory 
might recognize this as a key tenet of the pluralist and neo-Marxist theories as historical 
institutionalism does not recognize the state as a unitary actor in politics but as an amalgamation 
of competing institutional interests.  The major assumptions behind historical institutionalism are 
that institutions are constrained in their development by their historical relevance and that they 
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operate in a mimetic and bureaucratic path that is determined by their original purpose for 
existence.
17
  In the case of the IRGC, this theory would assume that the IRGC was founded as an 
alternative security resource for the Ayatollah‘s developing regime and that its current goals and 
interests are shaped by its original purpose.  Another vastly important assumption of historical 
institutionalism is that institutions change very little over long periods of time, operating 
bureaucratically to defend the status-quo, but suffer critical moments of upheaval and crisis that 
force sudden change.
18
    
The alternative to historical institutionalism is rational-choice institutionalism and, in 
contrast to the former, the latter holds to the belief that institutions base their decision making 
not on historical precedent but according to their varying interests over time.  For example, 
where historical institutionalists would posit that the IRGC must continue to adhere to the 
interests that inspired its founding after the Islamic Revolution, rational choice institutionalists 
would maintain that the IRGC has changing interests over time and that the individuals that 
make up the institution act through strategic calculation in their own best interests.  Two equally 
important assumptions of rational choice institutionalism are that the institution is fraught with 
conflicting groups that struggle for power and control and that this results in a competitive 
growth over time, known as the equilibrium order.
19
  This differs from historical institutionalists 
who maintain that institutional change occurs in periods of turmoil with static existence 
characterizing the years in between crises.   
These two branches of institutional thought are only summarized in the paragraphs above 
and one must assume that the theories are more complex than illustrated here.  The 
characteristics chosen to contrast the two are meant to illustrate the polar ends of the spectrum of 
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thought on political institutional change.  There are theories that fall in between these two 
radicals and the newest and perhaps most applicable to the case of the IRGC is sociological 
institutionalism.  The key tenets of these three positions are summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 1 
Institutional Theories 
 
 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social Obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Imitative 
Decision Making Instrumentality Appropriateness Convention 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Culturally supported Morally governed 
 
Sociological institutionalism does not abrogate the two traditional schools of thought; 
instead, it adds an additional variable to the equation for scholars seeking to understand the 
causal mechanisms influencing institutional behavior, evolution and outcomes.  Sociological 
institutionalists maintain that the cultural contexts in which institutions are born and evolve help 
to shape their characteristics.
20
  The theory seeks to explain the actual practices of the institutions 
and their relationships to the interests, available means and product.  Institutions are likened to 
culture and the influence of normative practices on individual behavior plays a great deal into the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the institution.   
  One can see, then, how sociological institutionalism does not nullify the rational-choice 
suggestion that individuals act rationally and are goal-oriented, only that the methods that are 
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chosen to pursue those goals are constrained by the normative dimensions of that individual‘s 
culture.  With regard to this study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the key tenet of 
sociological institutionalism that will be utilized extensively in our research is the belief that 
interests and means alone do not shape the decision making and the evolution of the institution.  
The key to understanding the IRGC is the recognition that pragmatic interests and logistical 
capabilities alone do not bring legitimacy to the institution.  In the broader cultural environment 
of Iran, the IRGC is constrained in its efforts to pursue its own interests by the necessity to 
maintain cultural legitimacy.  This ―logic of appropriateness‖ can potentially lead the IRGC to 
make decisions that do not serve its long-term interests and will play an influential role in 
shaping the evolution of the institution over time.    
This understanding of institutional change will shape the format of our study in the 
following pages as we investigate the socioeconomic and political factors in Iran that shape the 
interests of the IRGC, the capabilities of the institution to pursue these interests, and then 
normative dimensions in which the institution evolved from policy-implementing to policy-
making.  The structure of this research will be organized in a manner that recognizes both the 
historical and rational-choice institutionalists‘ understanding of institutional change.  This study 
makes the assumption that while equilibrium of change exists throughout the evolution of the 
institution, social and political crisis can act as a catalyst to initiate abrupt institutional change.  
Therefore, the following research is conducted within three time frames based on the three 
decades in which the IRGC has been in existence; within each period this paper investigates the 
interests of the IRGC, the means available to achieve those interests and the normative 
dimensions within which the IRGC operates to achieve those interests.  The outcome of these 
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three variables will be the degree of influence that the IRGC has held and it is our hypothesis that 
this influence has been shifting over those three decades from its conventional role of 
implementation to sanctioned policy making. 
 
Legitimacy 
The confluence of institutional interests, practical capabilities and social legitimacy 
brings us to the degree of influence that the IRGC has in Iranian policy making.  Since the 
interests as well as the capabilities of the sub organizations of the IRGC necessarily adapt over 
time, it stands to reason that their influence has, as well.  The few scholars who specialize in the 
history and contemporary role of the IRGC are keenly aware of a conspicuous concern facing the 
Guards both today and throughout its evolution: legitimacy.  The legitimacy of the IRGC over 
the past thirty years has been found in its cultural relevance as well as its defensive capabilities.  
American Enterprise Institute scholar Ali Alfoneh, expert on the Pasdaran, emphasizes the 
ideological nature of the events of 1979 as being influential in the birth of the organization; 
however, it is clear that the continued growth of the IRGC has brought it further from its 
doctrinal origins.  Three decades after the Islamic Republic‘s founding, ―former Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders are infiltrating the political, economic, and cultural 
life of Iran.‖21   Alfoneh‘s perspective on this development is strictly aligned with those who 
perceive the IRGC as challenging the clerical regime with a unified purpose and interest.  With 
multiple publications, Alfoneh has portrayed the IRGC as a monolithic institution that has spent 
the last thirty years working towards a complete takeover of Iranian politics and economy. While 
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this position is easily debated, the fact remains that the IRGC has come a considerable distance 
from its origins to gain some degree of influence in almost every sector of Iranian public life.    
 The sociological institutionalist theory would emphasize the cultural appropriateness of 
the IRGC, as we do also; however this is not meant to undercut the importance of the practical 
usefulness of the IRGC.  As the organization has evolved from policy implementing, a task 
largely concerned with practical usefulness, to policy making, it has become increasingly crucial 
that the group maintain its legitimacy. In cases throughout history this cultural legitimacy has 
been achieved through ideological avenues.  In Iran, the original ideology that gave the regime 
legitimacy was the pursuit of the Islamic state.  As time progresses, the normative values of the 
Iranian people evolve and so too must the political and economic institutions.   The IRGC has 
proven itself malleable to these normative expectations as the association continues to 
appropriately balance normative conventionalism with strategic instrumentalism.  
The IRGC can easily be described as opportunistic; in the early nineties the 
organization‘s leadership was conscious of the fact that Rafsanjani was wary of their 
involvement in anything remotely political. While their political interests were not put aside, 
they bided their time. When the reformist movement began to gain momentum they seized this 
opportunity to ―protect the revolution‖, thereby reinforcing their legitimacy.  Similarly, the 
IRGC uses foreign policy goals to help them achieve economic goals. As in Sudan or Venezuela, 
the IRGC uses ideological footholds to create hubs for trading and meeting with extremist groups 
to further their economic interests, as well as to achieve other foreign policy goals.   
It is this opportunistic approach that leads to the hypothesis that the historical and rational 
choice institutionalist theories are inadequate in their polarization of the options for institutional 
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change.  The internal conflict of the IRGC results in a natural competitive growth that maintains 
a steady rate over time.  Simultaneously, the IRGC as a whole is beholden to cultural 
appropriateness and is not likely to seize power where there is no legitimacy to support their 
gains.  Therefore, as opportunities for gains present themselves that concurrently provide 
legitimacy, the IRGC historically seizes those opportunities.  This trend shifts at inflection points 
which represent periods of crisis for the Islamic Republic of Iran.  These crises are opportunities 
for the IRGC to pursue a rapid gain in influence; for example the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989 or the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005.   
As the IRGC balances its strategic interests with its practical capabilities and normative 
limitations, it has proven to be a perfect example of sociological institutional theory which 
proposes that institutional change occurs in congruence with instrumental necessity and 
conventional appropriateness.  
 
Historical Perspectives 
In ―Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics‖, 
David Thaler and the contributing authors provide policy makers with a detailed descriptive 
analysis of the nature of Iranian political leadership.  The primary objective of this book is to 
illustrate the dynamic and fluctuating political landscape of Iran and, in doing so, the authors 
analyze Iran‘s formal institutions in depth and identify the informal networks through which 
power is exercised.  While these formal institutions are useful in the enforcement of state policy, 
they serve mainly as vehicles of influence, leveraged by key individuals and power centers.
22
  
These power centers are driven by competition and cooperation, the implementation of either 
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depending on relationships between individuals.  The networks of relationships that operate 
behind the scenes of these political institutions are vast, but the authors identify four major 
factions that define the competitive nature of Iranian factional politics: traditional conservatives, 
reformists, pragmatic conservatives and principalists.  All four back the ideology of the velayet-e 
faqih but compete with each other for power, using the country‘s political institutions as their 
vehicles of influence.  
The political process in Iran contrasts sharply with our own Western experiences and the 
authors warn US policy makers that they need to understand the unique nature of Iranian politics 
in order to build a diplomatic relationship with the country.  The United States‘ foreign policy 
towards Iran cannot operate on the assumption that we are dealing with a unitary actor.  
Factional politics present unique challenges to the United States‘ diplomats, particularly because 
we do not have the intelligence resources to understand those schisms and the distribution of 
authority and influence. Therefore, Thaler et. al. advise US policy makers to avoid using 
domestic politics as a tool of diplomacy.
23
  
 On the same note, the IRGC itself is not a monolithic institution that is unilaterally 
challenging the authority of the clerical regime.  Frederic Wehrey, author of multiple works on 
the foundation, evolution and cotemporary role of the IRGC in Iranian politics, frequently 
emphasizes the fact that the growth of the IRGC has been largely organic, driven by competing 
interest groups within the Pasdaran.  This is a common feature in all Iranian politics, but it is 
particularly difficult for Western scholars to understand in the context of the IRGC since many 
find it easier to analyze the organization as a unitary threat to the status quo.  It is nevertheless a 
crucial aspect of Iranian politics that must be understood by scholars and statesmen alike in order 
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to properly analyze the developing events inside Iran and outside the borders of the Islamic 
Republic. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Wehrey believes, is not a monolithic 
institution capable of a unified takeover of Iran‘s political system.  The author does, however, 
leave room in his analysis for speculation as to whether the IRGC is capable, as an association of 
varied interests, of supplanting the authority of the clerical regime.
24
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CHAPTER 2: IRGC MILITARY INFLUENCE 
 
Guarding the Revolution 
In the first decade of its existence, the IRGC‘s interests were largely correlated with the 
circumstances that prompted its founding.  The Pasdaran‘s mandate is found in the constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where Article 150 states that ―The Islamic Revolution Guards 
Corps … is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its 
achievements…‖25  From the beginning, the relevance of the Guards has been intimately tied to 
the clerical regime; the security and growth of the regime was of principle importance to the 
Pasdaran. Therefore, in legislation and in practicality, the objectives of the IRGC were quite 
simply to protect the security of the regime which brought them into being.  In the decade 
following the ousting of the Shah, the resources of the IRGC were concentrated on the ultimate 
objective: to guard the new regime against the enemies of the revolution.  The opponents against 
whom the Pasdaran was tasked with defending were, at the time of the writing of the 
constitution, those inside the state who opposed the Revolution. As such, the IRGC‘s early role 
was primarily internal, relating to domestic defense instead of international.     
The Pasdaran‘s natural enemies were the few remaining supporter of the Shah. Other than 
existing quietly in society, these were found mostly in the Artesh- the Shah‘s military that failed 
to prevent the revolution.  Rival factions opposing the Shah also existed, and many had fought 
alongside Khomeini‘s revolutionaries with the shared objective of ousting the Shah.  After 
witnessing the success of their efforts, rival factions such as the Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MKO) 
and Fedayeen Khalq became enemies of the Revolution as they prioritized nationalism or 
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socialism over Islamic rule.
26
  Dissent was also found in minority regions throughout Iran among 
Kurds and Arabs that feared marginalization in post-revolution society and politics.  
The remnants of the state military, the Artesh, presented the new clerical regime with a 
dilemma.  A country in any circumstance needs a military for the defense of its sovereignty; 
however, the existing forces had served the efforts of the ousted regime and their loyalties could 
not be guaranteed. Khomeini, under the pressure of time to consolidate his power in the post-
revolution vacuum, needed muscle to back up his ideological legitimacy and the Artesh was not 
trustworthy for this role.  The Pasdaran served the purpose of supporting Khomeini‘s leadership 
with hard power, but the threat of the Artesh still existed; there were various attempted attacks 
by military units against Khomeini, including a plot by the air force to bomb the Ayatollah‘s 
residence.  The risk posed by the Shah‘s military was mitigated to some degree by the existence 
of the Pasdaran as a balancing force, but debate existed among leadership with regard to the 
extent to which the military should be purged of the supporters of the ousted regime.
27
  Top 
military leaders were executed during and immediately following the revolution, but many 
believed that the current military should have been demobilized entirely and a new force built 
anew out of the revolutionary fighters. Khomeini‘s position settled on purging the Artesh of its 
disloyal elements, and merging the remnants with revolutionary militias.  The maintenance of a 
strong military was necessary for meeting unknown threats and while the purge of the Artesh did 
take place, it was on a smaller scale than many of the Revolution‘s leaders had hoped for.28  
Sources vary in reports on the scale of the purge, but Iran itself recorded 10,000-12,000 
dismissed military personnel.
29
  Most of these came from ground forces; among those, up to 90% 
were officers.
30
  Those who served the Shah more directly were imprisoned or fled; many were 
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executed.  During the revolution, 250,000 had deserted the military and these were granted 
amnesty by the Supreme Leader, excluding those who had committed murder or torture. 
31
  What 
remained after the purge of the Artesh and its merger with revolutionary militants was a semi-
reliable army of useful size.   
In the first few decades of its existence, the Pasdaran operated parallel with the Islamic 
Republic‘s army and the state intelligence organization.  A little more than three months after the 
decree was issued that established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the ground forces 
were put to the test with a rising rebellion among Kurds in Iran‘s northwest region.  The conflict 
began  on May 5
th
 in 1979 and was over only a week later, with the Kurds requesting to 
negotiate a ceasefire. 
32
  Khomeini refused to negotiate with the Kurdish rebels and, instead, 
utilized the Guards to execute a total of 31 rebels. 
33
   
From there, the Pasdaran extended their mission to crushing all dissent against the 
clerical regime.  The leftist groups that had shared a common goal during their struggle to 
overthrow the Shah found that they had not achieved their personal objectives and were 
marginalized to the point of fighting, guerilla-style, against the Supreme Leader‘s Guard Corps.34     
The Pasdaran fell naturally into its role as protector of the Supreme Leader and the clerics.  
There was no shortage of domestic threats to the regime and the Guard Corps found its 
legitimacy in the product of its work: the elimination of the leftist, nationalist and ethnic militias 
and their supporters.  The Guard Corps gained momentum in their struggle against the Fedayeen 
Kalq and MKO in 1982, executing or otherwise killing over 60 members of the two leftist 
organizations.
35
  The un-Islamic values and practices of the groups were enough to justify the 
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IRGC‘s actions, but most raids and executions of the MKO and Fedayeen Kalq militants were 
followed up with accusations that the militant groups had been working for the United States.   
Before the decree which established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and before 
the Revolution itself, there existed in Iran a group of vigilante enforcement squads, known as 
komitehs, which served to impose Islamic values and guard against opposition.  With the birth of 
the IRGC, the komitehs found an increased role in the Islamic Republic as secret police for the 
Guard Corps.  The komitehs operated outside of the law, ignoring even the decrees of the 
Supreme Leader himself, and they were generally hated.
36
  Impertinent, uneducated and usually 
lower-class, the komiteh members served the clerical regime as a brute force against leftist and 
ethnic groups.  Komiteh members justified their expansive authority, saying ―There are no clear 
limits imposed on the komiteh guards in dealing with corruption and godlessness…‖37 
The breadth of the influence of the komitehs put pressure of Iranian society and generated 
a great deal of hatred and distrust.  In spite of the negative publicity and social distain, the 
Supreme Leader maintained that they served a necessary function in bringing stability out of the 
post-revolution chaos that defined Iranian society ―until the authority of the government has been 
established‖38.  Like the IRGC, the komitehs were useful to the clerical regime, which stood on 
an ideological foundation alone and needed that brute force to enforce its vision for the future of 
the Islamic Republic.  The terror and destruction that the komitehs used to serve their objectives 
became a style of operations used in the decades to follow by the clerical regime, the IRGC and 
its paramilitary wing, the Basij.   
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Iran – Iraq War 
 
The first test for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps came soon after the group was 
first established; less than two years after the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Tehran, 
neighboring Iraq invaded Iran beginning the Iran-Iraq War.  In the eight years that followed, tens 
of thousands of young Iranians, recruited by the IRGC with promises of a martyr‘s welcome in 
paradise, went willingly to their deaths at the frontlines of the battle. What started as the 
culmination of a dispute between Iran and Iraq over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway 
became a protracted war for the defense of the Islamic Revolution.  Iraq‘s aim was not to 
overthrow the Islamic Republic, though there was a clear struggle for control over the Persian 
Gulf region; nevertheless, the clerical leadership viewed the attack as a direct threat to the 
Velayat-e Faqih.
 39
       
The timing of the Iraqi attack was not by chance; the Ba‘athist regime was aware of 
Iran‘s preoccupation with its own post-revolution internal struggle for power.  As a consequence 
of the prolonged effort to consolidate power in Iran, the country was left with a distracted 
leadership and an emaciated military. The plans to merge the IRGC with the Artesh were in 
place, but Saddam Hussein struck before that plan could be implemented.  The Artesh was 
lacking in leadership since higher rank officials were either executed or escaped the country.  It 
was in this context that the Pasdaran stepped up to the plate and took on the defense of the 
Islamic Republic.
40
  This role was a natural manifestation of the IRGC‘s purpose and the Guards 
found all the legitimacy they needed in their defense of the Islamic Revolution against the 
foreign invaders.  Their interests were simple and the power given them to carry out their 
mission was virtually unchecked.   
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The invasion began in September, 1980, with the Iraqi objective of destroying Iran‘s 
grounded Air force.  The air assault failed initially, but the ground attack that followed was 
successful in gaining control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and capturing the cities of 
Khorramshahr and Abadan.  The Pasdaran were not able to fend off the Iraqi offense in open 
battle, but the military force of the IRGC was not without its skills.  For months the IRGC‘s 
ground forces waged a steady war using urban war tactics, against which the Iraqi Air Force was 
not able to defend.  The Ba‘athist regime successfully took the two cities from Iran by the end of 
October, but spent the next year defending against the determined, if ineffective, air raids lead by 
the Pasdaran 
41
  The Iranians bided their time, rallying the Pasdaran with the remainder of the 
Artesh, and in spring of 1981 the first offensive to regain their territory was launched.  The 
Pasdaran and Artesh took back Khorramshahr and Abadan by May of 1982 and Iraq withdrew its 
forces back to the original boundary line between the two countries.
 42
   
The cooperation between the Artesh and the IRGC had strongly influenced the direction 
of the battle and was responsible for Iran‘s eventual successful defeat of the Iraqi invasion.  The 
war could have been considered at its end at that point, if it were not for the fact that IRGC 
leadership saw an opportunity to expand its role and decidedly took it.  In Article 152 of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic, there is a mandate for the country to base its foreign policy 
on the rejection of all forms of domination.
43
  Likewise, article 154 mandates supporting ―the 
just struggles of the freedom fighters against the oppressors in every corner of the globe.‖44  The 
IRGC adopted these directives as their own and their interests expanded from just defending the 
revolution, to exporting it.  The Pasdaran‘s new objective was the overthrow of the Ba‘athist 
Iraqi regime, beginning with the southern port of Basra.
45
  With its powerful ideology and the 
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exuberance of tens of thousands of Iranian youth, the IRGC launched its attack against Iraq 
relying primarily on human wave tactics.  This method was used for two years without success 
and the IRGC was forced to turn to the Artesh for support.  In another two years, with the 
cooperation of the two military branches, Iran captured the Port of Faw thereby cutting Iraq off 
from the Gulf.
46
  The move naturally shook the Iraqi regime, but equally important was the ripple 
of fear that it spread throughout the region and in the West.  The resulting arms embargo against 
Iran strictly limited the ability of the Pasdaran and Artesh to continue in its mission to overthrow 
the Ba‘athists. Iran lost control of the Port of Faw and by 1988 economic and political pressure 
from the West succeeded in forcing the IRGC into accepting a ceasefire agreement, as they were 
ordered to do so by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
 47
   
Neither the blind ideological zeal of the IRGC nor the strategic proficiency of the Artesh 
was able to succeed against the combined fear of the world‘s leaders that Iran could emerge as a 
regional hegemon.  Despite the IRGC‘s failure to overthrow Saddam, the Guards did succeed in 
vastly increasing their own influence in Iran.
48
  The social indoctrination techniques used to 
convince young Iranians, soon to be known as the Basij, to become martyrs for the Islamic 
Republic became an ideological pillar that supports the establishment even today.
49
  The 
necessary political and economic influence that grew out of the IRGC‘s military offensive are 
both foundations from which the Guards continue to expand their influence inside and outside of 
Iran.  
The forced end to the Iran-Iraq war illustrates the early conflicting interests that existed 
between the clerics and the IRGC.  The two institutions were temporarily aligned during the war 
in that the Iraqi invasion provided legitimacy to both the IRGC and the clerics.  It also united the 
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much divided population in abhorrence of Iraq.
50
  For the IRGC, even as they necessarily 
cooperated with the Artesh, the Iran-Iraq war solidified the image in the minds of Iranians of the 
Pasdaran as the protectors of the Islamic Revolution.  At the end of the war, however, the 
Supreme Leader recognized the strategic necessity of accepting the ceasefire while, 
ideologically, the IRGC was unwilling to accept this.  Many Pasdaran wished to continue on in 
their mission and disagreed with the clerics, failing to see the political interests of the regime as 
any more important than the ideological interests of the IRGC.    
 
Domestic Capabilities 
 
Ayatollah Khomeini‘s frequent references to a 20-million strong army conjure visions of 
a limitless military that inspires fear in the hearts of global leaders.
51
  The vision, however, never 
materialized to the scale that the Supreme Leader imagined it would.  The IRGC was created 
initially as a light infantry force, meant to be an elite guard for the clerics and a counter balance 
to the untrustworthy Artesh.  The eight-year Iran-Iraq war immediately put those intentions to 
rest.  By 1986 the IRGC had established air and naval forces, though they consisted mostly of 
patrol boats and helicopters.
 52
  What changed most about the Pasdaran in the first decade was its 
offensive capability.  The group was never meant to be able to pursue an offense, but per the 
Iranian Constitution it was easy to justify offensive action against Iraq in order to protect the 
innocents from oppression.  With this ideological mandate, the Pasdaran were able to recruit 
members for its new paramilitary branch called the Basij.  The Basij, not officially a part of the 
IGRC until the 90s, were essentially used as human cannon fodder and were sent in waves 
against the enemy, sometimes without so much as a rifle to arm themselves.  The human-wave 
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assaults were eventually ineffective and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties.
 53
  In the early 
1990s the Basij numbered approximately 30,000, though by the end of the decade they boasted 
numbers upwards of 200,000.
 54
    
During post-war efforts at institutionalization, there was a movement to formally merge 
the Artesh with the IRGC, but with 150,000 servicemen in the 1990s the IRGC did not need the 
Artesh and these efforts were eventually abandoned.
55
  Under the conservative president Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, a merger between the two forces would have bolstered the legitimacy of the 
regime, but it offered little in return to the IRGC.  The Guards had already seen a decrease in 
their budget as the IRI‘s defense budget shrunk from 40% of gross national product to 10% by 
1994; from Rafsanjani‘s perspective, the consolidation of the two branches would have also 
consolidated defense expenditures.
 56
   Nevertheless, during a time when the Iranian economy 
was in turmoil and infrastructure was outdated and in disrepair, the IRGC flourished.  This was 
largely due to the Pasdaran‘s role in reconstruction, as will be discussed further on in this 
chapter.  The IRGC was given the responsibility for reconstruction and development in part to 
get them out of the way of the Artesh, but the role suited them also as a means of supplementing 
their income.   By the end of the decade, the IRGC had grown in membership to 170,000 and 
boasted control of most, if not all, of the country‘s long-range missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction.
57
  At the same time, the military force lost its Navy branch when the commander 
who oversaw both the Artesh and the IRGC simultaneously, Ali Shamkani, split command of the 
two forces, taking the IRGC‘s navy with him to the Artesh.58 
In retrospect, it is ironic that Rafsanjani‘s attempts to distract the IRGC by placing them 
in command of reconstruction efforts was the vehicle that enabled the institutionalization of the 
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group and the evolution of the Pasdaran from a light infantry ground force to a political 
challenge to both the Reformists and the Conservatives.  The clerics have come to fear and resent 
the growing reach of the Pasdaran; well-known senior cleric Ayatollah Hossein Ali was quoted 
as saying ―It is no longer the rule of the qualified jurist; rather it is the rule of the generals.‖59 
The IRGC‘s military and political capabilities are directly influenced by the economic means 
available which, for the IRGC, have been plentiful since the end of the Iran-Iraq war.  The 
clandestine nature of the Pasdaran‘s economic activities allows it to maintain secrecy in its 
military operations, as well; because the majority of its funding comes from its financial 
investments, the IRGC‘s budget is mostly unknown.  This facilitates the group‘s participation in 
the pursuit of nuclear capabilities and its work in missile programs.  The Guards are also 
suspected of using universities and other academic institutions to support and cover up its 
nuclear research.
60
  
In the meantime, the IRGC is pursuing the military capability to quell threats from 
regional external opponents. The Pasdaran‘s Brigadier General Hossein Salami is seeking to 
bring self-sufficiency to the IRGC‘s defense industry and has launched programs to develop 
military hardware such as missile delivery devices and aerial equipment in order to gain control 
of the defense industry.
61
  Under the leadership of Salami, the IRGC successfully tested medium 
range Shahab-3 missiles and solid-fuel missiles that have a range of up to 1,200 miles.
 62
  At the 
same time, mass production of supersonic ballistic missiles with a range of up to 500 miles is 
currently underway.  Salami describes the IRGC as combat ready and calls it a developed, 
modern organization with expertise in military combat, security and soft war.
63
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Basij Organization 
 
Being one of the primary sources of hard power for the clerical regime, the Basij force 
recruits volunteers, usually younger men, to serve in their ranks as enforcers of the regime‘s 
mandates.  It is these young men who are often cited as responsible for the detainment of the 
regime‘s political opponents.  The Basij serve three specific roles in the service of the Supreme 
Leader: 1) promoting the revolution and the vision of the velayet-e faqih in Iranian society, 2) 
carrying out indoctrination activities of the IRGC and 3) enforcing the mandates of the Supreme 
Leader.  While the organization‘s founding was based on military necessity, in more recent years 
the Basij are being used to work on large development projects in rural provinces in Iran.  These 
projects are funded by government contracts that were awarded (either through bidding or by 
bypassing the bidding process) to the IRGC‘s construction and engineering conglomerate, 
Khatam al-Anbiya.  In 2009 the clerics expressed to the IRGC the need to expand the Basij‘s 
forces beyond the military role with the hope of attracting not only zealous young men, but also 
more skilled Iranians for civil services roles.  In the view of the clerics and senior IRGC 
members, the emphasis on the Basij as a military unit was precluding the interests of those who 
are not military-minded.  As a result, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the Commander of the Basij, has 
sought out a variety of other needs in society that the organization could meet.  In the pursuit of 
this mission, the Basij created an information system to collect details about the perceived social 
problems that Iranian citizens believe the government is responsible for solving.
64
 
Naqdi stated in a 2009 interview that the Basij Organization for the Oppressed is 
available to accomplish the objectives of the revolution where the regime itself is unable to.  This 
raises questions about the loyalties of the Basij Organization; does it serve the clerics as an arm 
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of the IRGC or has it, much like the IRGC itself, devised its own goals and means apart from the 
regime.
65
  The Basij Organization is devoutly ideological and still exists for the purpose of 
continuing the revolution; however, it receives its funding and its projects from the IRGC.   
The organization is on a mission to makeover their reputation and image and is achieving 
this through the provision of humanitarian aid and infrastructure development.  In the less 
privileged provinces of Iran, the organization provides jobs, vaccinates children and preserves 
historic monuments.  In some aspects the Basij has been successful in this endeavor; they are 
viewed with much more favor in the remote provinces than in the cities where the organization is 
associated with the brutal suppression of populist demonstrations.   With their new focus on 
social development, the Basij Resistance Force formally changed its name to the Basij 
Organization for the Oppressed, a clear move away from the past monopoly of military issues on 
the agenda of the organization. 
66
 
An arm of the Basij, the Student Basij Organization (SBO), led by Reza Seraj, serves the 
IRGC‘s agenda by transforming and improving the student Basij groups on university campuses.  
The members of the SBO have offered their own suggestions in the current mission to change the 
image and focus of the Basij; this plan includes assisting the government in order to improve 
efficiency, providing humanitarian services, and promoting religious and cultural programs for 
university students.   Seraj presented these goals as the contribution of the SBO towards the 
overall mission to Islamize university students and to increase IRGC military membership.   
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Exporting the Revolution 
In the eight years that followed the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, as hundreds of 
thousands of young Iranian Basij were dying in waves of attacks on the border between the 
warring states, the young Islamic regime was simultaneously building the operational foundation 
for decades of future covert foreign influence.  Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
has its own clandestine foreign operations branch known as the Quds Force.  The influential and 
lethal military force seeks to control and manipulate the economic, cultural, religious and 
political spheres of many of Iran‘s neighboring countries for the purpose of exporting the Islamic 
revolution and expanding the regime‘s influence outside of its own borders.67  Though always 
consistent with this ideological goal of the IRGC, Quds Force operations take many different 
shapes depending on where they are at work and what the nature of the conflict is.  The IRGC‘s 
foreign operations branch operates parallel to Iran‘s foreign policy executive and conducts covert 
operations not only in Iraq but in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Turkey and as far west as 
Venezuela.
68
  The clandestine nature of their work necessitates a degree of speculation as to what 
the particular role of each foreign mission is, but one can make a reasonable assumption based 
on a comprehensive understanding of the ideology and interests of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps. 
Iran lost significant ground in the first months of the Iran-Iraq War and the eight years of 
conflict focused Iranian resources nearly entirely on the territory under dispute, leaving little else 
to fulfill the vision of the IRGC of spreading the revolution abroad.  Before the formation of the 
Quds Force, foreign operations were carried out by a variety of smaller groups that were, during 
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the war, consolidated under the umbrella of the Mujahidin of the Islamic Revolution (MIR)
69
.  
The MIR was headed by Mohsen Rezai who was eventually recruited into the IRGC as the head 
of the new ideological army, the Quds Force.  The Quds Force was given two missions, at the 
outset: to protect the revolution at home and to export it outside of Iran.  During the Iran-Iraq 
war the MIR followed Khomeini‘s lead and focused its efforts in Iraq.  Almost immediately 
following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, the MIR began to work on behalf of the IRGC to 
expand the Islamic Republic‘s extraterritorial influence, beginning in Lebanon).70  In 1990 the 
responsibility for exporting the revolution was transitioned to the newly formed Quds Force, 
though the degree to which leadership and organization remained the same is not clear.  Mohsen 
Rezai no longer headed up Iran‘s extraterritorial efforts after 1990; this responsibility was given 
to Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who spent eight years in this role and was replaced in 1998 
by Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the current leader of the Quds Force.
71
   
Iraq 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard has significant financial and military investments in 
Iraq and has focused a great deal of its efforts on training and preparing for violent conflict.  This 
is not to say, however, that the IRGC does not take an interest in the political evolution of its 
neighbor, Iraq.  The IRGC sees the advantage in controlling the direction of political parties like 
SCIRI and Dawah especially in the context of the open elections that Iraq had in January of 2005 
and March of 2010.  While keeping violent uprising as a backup plan, the office of the Supreme 
Leader instructed the Commander of the Quds Forces in 2005 to keep operatives in Iraq but to 
maintain clandestine positions so as to not identify any of the political participants with the Quds 
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Force, thereby skewing the outcome.  It was the hope of the regime that, while it may not have 
had control over the outcome of the vote, that if it did turn in favor of Iran-friendly parties like 
SCIRI, that Iran would have a new channel for control.
72
  
SCIRI and Dawah both have close relationships with Iran and it was not clear, during the 
2005 elections, whether Iran supported the success of one over the other.  It was not ideal, 
however, for JAM's political wing, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, to have gained too much control in 
the legislature.  Al-Sadr and JAM have ideological differences with the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the relationship is strained by the lack of support that the IRGC has from Al-Sadr on the 
doctrine of velayat-e faqih.  Al-Sadr is not useless to the IRGC, but politically he offers less 
stability than Iran is looking for.  The IRGC sees the democratic electoral system in Iraq as an 
opportunity to gain control and Al-Sadr does not fit into that system; he is of greater use to the 
IRGC as an instrument of violence.
73
 
The regime of the Supreme Leader also had considerable interests at stake during the 
2005 drafting of the Iraqi Constitution.    While Iran was unable to directly influence the 
outcome of the process, the IRGC was able to influence those who did hold this power through 
its political connections, e.g. SCIRI and Dawah parties.  These two parties were, at the time, 
proponents of federalism for Iraq, a system that benefits Iran because a decentralized state 
presents less of a threat to Iran and is more easily influenced subversively.   
As able, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provides weapons to Iraqi Shi'a militants 
through various smuggling routes.  One of the most widely known is that of Abu Mustafa al-
Sheibani, who in 2008 was named along with Deputy Commander of the Ramadan 
 34 
 
Headquarters, Ahmad Foruzandeh, as an "individual fueling the Iraqi insurgency" based on 
evidence that Foruzandeh and several hundred individuals belonging to his smuggling network 
had transported a new type of improvised explosive devices known as an explosively formed 
penetrator (EFP) into Iraq from Iran.
74
  The Sheibani network is believed to be connected to Iran 
based on the ties that it has to JAM and Badr Corps.  It is important to Iran that they be able to 
continue to deny responsibility for continued violence in Iraq and therefore the Sheibani 
Network, because of its ties with Iran, does not carry out attacks itself.  US and Coalition forces 
in Iraq have been largely unable to produce a "smoking gun" on the IRGC to prove that Iran is 
providing weapons to Iraq.  Multi-Nation Forces have, however, discovered weapons caches that 
are suspected of originating in Iran.  One MNF-I report claims that Coalition forces have 
discovered almost 200 weapons caches between July 2006 and May 2008 that are suspected of 
having come from Iran.
75
 
The capability of the IRGC to train Shi'a militants in and outside Iraq is beneficial to the 
regime's interests on several levels.  Most obviously, training Iraqis gives them the intellectual 
and technological knowledge and skills that they need to fight the enemies that they share with 
the IRGC, e.g. the United States and Coalition forces.  A simultaneous benefit of this training is 
the opportunity to indoctrinate Shi'a Muslims with the principles that guide the Ayatollah's 
regime.  When trained Iraqis return to their homeland to fight they do not simply bring back 
knowledge and skills, they are transporting the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  While 
the focus of Iran's political manipulation is on SCIRI (now ISCI) and Dawah, the Quds Force's 
training initiatives are targeted towards al-Sadr's JAM and the Special Group Criminals (SGC). 
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The network that is used to train militants in Iraq is highly developed and has several 
areas of focus including logistics and support, weapons employment, engineering and explosives, 
tactics and information operations.
76
   Training on this level is usually performed in Iraq, often 
by Lebanese Hezbollah representatives, and is themed around the broad vision of evicting US 
forces from Iraq.
77
  Not all militants are trained in Iraq, however; the Iraqi Master-Trainer 
Strategy brings Iraqis to Iran for advanced training that they will return to Iraq with and pass on 
to other militants.  This technique minimizes the risk for Iran and maximizes the results for 
militants with more reliable access to expertise coming from Iraqis themselves.  The Master-
Trainer course focuses on more advanced areas of warfare including explosively formed 
penetrators, projective weapons, conventional weapons and tactics and guerilla warfare.
78
   
The IRGC's master-trainer tactic has an additional benefit of eliminating unnecessary 
distrust and rancor between Iraqi militants and their Iranian benefactors.  Despite the socio-
religious ties that the two nations have with one another, there is a history of betrayal and 
conflict that speaks volumes over the ideological rhetoric of those that support the velayat-e 
faqih and Iraqi-Iranian solidarity.  
 
Lebanon 
 
Iran does not work clandestinely in Lebanon to the extent that it does in Iraq and no other 
proxy organizations other than Hezbollah itself have been set up by the IRGC to facilitate 
subversive weapons transfers, financial support or training.  Hezbollah itself does use several 
organizations as the face of its operations to collect funds, manage financial services and 
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coordinate with the community and development projects.  Bayt al-Mal ("House of Money"), 
with offices in six locations throughout Lebanon, serves as the terrorist group's bank and 
investment firm and it operates under the direct supervision of Hezbollah leader, Hassan 
Nasrallah, though it is managed by Hysayn al-Shami.  In 2006 the US Treasury Department 
named Al-Shami as an individual that provides financial support to the Iran-funded terrorist 
network.
79
  The organization itself was also named as a supporter of terrorism.  Jihad Al Binna 
Developmental Association (JBDA) is a company that has been set up to manage the 
development of infrastructure in Lebanese Shi'a communities.  JBDA manages construction 
projects, educational initiatives and helps refugees and displaced Lebanese find shelter and 
homes.  The JBDA also has several locations including in the Beqaa Valley and Beirut.   Crucial 
to the operation of Hezbollah is the Islamic Resistance Support Organization, a branch of 
Hezbollah that collects donations in order to fund its operations.  The organization advertises for 
donations on television, particularly the al-Manar network.   
At first glance it may appear that Iran is the sole benefactor of Hezbollah and that the 
IRGC has full control of the terrorist organization.  On closer examination, it is clear that 
Hezbollah provides Iran with a service in exchange for the weapons, training, and finances that it 
receives.
80
  Hezbollah serves the Iranian agenda by provoking Israel and terrorizing Israeli 
civilians with rocket attacks.  Hezbollah also provides training to the IRGC's other proxies, most 
importantly to Iraqis.  Iran walks on eggshells in Iraq because the regime lives with the real 
threat of the US and Coalition forces camped across the border.  Iran has far less to loose from 
the international world's indignation over its operations in Lebanon than in Iraq.  Regardless of 
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what Hezbollah does provide Iran in return for the regime's support, it is also clear that 
Hezbollah owes its existence and relative success in terrorizing Israel to Iran.   
Understanding the IRGC‘s position on Israel and Western expansionism and Lebanon's 
situation both geographically and politically, it is not difficult to see where the ideological 
similarities between the two nations come from.  In recognition of these similarities, the Guards 
support Hezbollah through a variety of different avenues.  For decades there have been IRGC 
cadres operating in Lebanon, supporting Hezbollah.  More recently, however, intelligence 
reports have noted a decline in the numbers of Quds Force operatives that are permanently in 
Lebanon.  The numbers are reported to have sunk as low as 15 (other reports say that there are at 
least 800 Iranian personnel still said to be in Lebanon).
81
  There are reportedly "reserves", as 
well, but they are not suspected of having real training and experience.
82
 
Perhaps the IRGC's most crucial contribution to Hezbollah and its efforts against Israel 
and Western forces are the military weapons and technology that are regularly transferred into 
Lebanon.  Short range rockets are the primary IRGC export to Hezbollah in Lebanon; around ten 
thousand have small rockets with accompanying individual launchers have been delivered and 
these alone have ranges of about 19-28 km.  The Associated Press reported in 2008 that at least 
350 of these small, short-range missiles had been fired into Israel that year, alone.
83
  These 
rockets are not Israel's greatest concern, however; recent attacks indicate that Iran has begun 
delivering longer-range missiles that can reach as much as 70 kilometers distance.
84
  Of even 
greater concern is the Israeli intelligence that reported in April of 2010 that Syria (most likely 
receiving them from Iran) had transferred long-range Scud missiles to Hezbollah.
85
  These Scud 
missiles have a maximum range of 435 miles, putting Jerusalem and Tel Aviv within range of 
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Hezbollah.  Iran is known to have provided Hezbollah with an AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles 
that have been modified by an Iranian engineer to carry tandem warheads.
86
  
 In addition to weapons, Hezbollah has benefited from training by Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps' Quds Forces in the past.  Today, Hezbollah is more likely to be providing training 
on behalf of the Quds Force, instead of receiving it.  Hezbollah partnered with the IRGC in 1989 
to establish a training camp in Sudan, following a coup that brought the radical National Islamic 
Front to power.  Hezbollah provides a valuable service to Iran by adopting Iraqi Shi'a insurgents 
for weeks at a time to train in tactics, weapons utilization and IED construction.   
 
Afghanistan 
 
The Fourth Corps of the Quds Force is responsible for exporting the Iranian revolution to 
Central Asia and operations are based out of Mushhad from the Al-Ansar base.  US Officials 
disagree on whether the IRGC is involved directly in Afghanistan, or not.  Iranian made 
weapons, particularly the explosively formed penetrator that is unique to Iran and has been used 
in Iraq, as well, have been used by Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.  AK-47s and C-4 plastic 
explosives have also been found that resemble what Iran transfers to Iraq and Hezbollah.  More 
obvious assistance is given to Afghans by Iran in the form of sanctuary which the Islamic 
Republic offers Taliban fighters.
87
  
Little else in the way of evidence is available to the public that will prove or disprove 
direct Iranian intervention in Afghanistan.  In 2007 ISAF Commander General Daniel McNeill 
reported that Coalition forces had captured two shipments of weapons that based, solely on 
appearance, seemed to originate in Iran.  The characteristics that were assumed to have given 
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away the origin of the weapons were the explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) that are used in 
Iraq.  The assumption is that the EFPs in Iraq come from Iran and, if they appear to be the same 
product, the EFPs in Afghanistan must come from Iraq, as well.  In 2008, Under Secretary of 
State R. Nicholas Burns declared that the U.S. had irrefutable evidence that the Iranian regime 
was transferring weapons to the Taliban, however when Defense Secretary Robert Gates was 
questioned on the issue he indicated that there was no evidence of Quds Force operations in 
Afghanistan.
88
  This is not to say that Iran is not shipping weapons to the Taliban, only that it is 
not clear that these weapons are coming from the IRGC's covert elite forces.  Nevertheless, until 
this information is declassified or available on open source, it is difficult to make a judgment on 
Iran's activities in Iran.  Iran's construction and development businesses have received multiple 
contracts in Afghanistan and speculation abounds as to whether these companies could be covers 
for transporting weapons to the Taliban.   
 
Venezuela 
 
Hezbollah was already in Venezuela as far back as the 1990s; it was from this location 
that the terrorist organization carried out the attacked against the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the 
AMIA building in 1994, both in Buenos Aires.
89
  Iran operates in Venezuela via the IRGC's 
Quds Force and works in partnership with the Lebanese Hezbollah.  The duel goals of Hezbollah 
in Venezuela are to create an independent channel of funding for local terrorist networks to 
supplement the income from Iran and to employ criminal networks to train operatives and 
develop their skills and terrorist capabilities.   
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Far different from many of its covert operations in other foreign countries, Hezbollah and 
Quds Force operatives are working in a small area in northern Columbia and northwestern 
Venezuela as missionaries, hard at work converting the Wayuu people to Shi'ite Islam.  Another 
unique function of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Quds Force in Venezuela is training Mexican 
drug cartel members.  Intelligence reports from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency 
revealed in 2008 that Mexican drug cartels are sending assassins to Venezuela and to Iran to 
receive training from the elite Quds Force and the Lebanese Hezbollah in constructing IEDs, 
sniping, commando warfare, tactics and weapons.
90
  In October of 2006 two explosive devices 
were found near the Caracas American Embassy, though the explosives did not detonate.  One of 
those explosives was boxed with Hezbollah Venezuela pamphlets.  Hezbollah did claim 
responsibility, though no other explosives have been found and no attacks have been attempted 
since then.   
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CHAPTER 3: IRGC ECONOMIC INFLUENCE 
 
Originally formed with the intention of creating a security force to defend the Supreme 
Leader and the clerics, the IRGC has developed into an economic establishment in its own right.  
Companies owned, operated and controlled by the IRGC have, over the past three decades, been 
forming an unofficial economic agenda.  The ―People‘s Army‖ that protected the revolutionary 
regime now conducts business affairs in the defense industry, construction and infrastructure 
development, manufacturing and investment markets and in the black market.  Whether or not 
these economic activities exceed the IRGC‘s original purposes outlined in Article 147 of Iran‘s 
1979 constitution may be debatable, but it is hardly relevant as the Guards have gained a degree 
of influence over the Iranian economy that is virtually irreversible.   The organization receives a 
share of criticism from home and abroad, but it is nevertheless extremely successful in its private 
and government contracts and appears to be on a path of continued growth.   
 
Goals and Interests 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps‘ economic goals reflect the group‘s survival 
instinct and have a noteworthy influence on the Iranian economy, today.   Following the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, the nation turned its focus inward with an urgent need for rapid reconstruction 
and economic recovery.  The heavy financial cost of the war and the embargos employed by the 
West took a noticeable toll on the Iranian economy.
91
 Simultaneously, Iran experienced a 
massive population boom that saw a growth from 34 million at the start of the revolution to 60 
million.
92
  Food and energy subsidies that were established by the clerical regime with the goal 
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of garnering popular support quickly became an economic burden as the population increased 
steadily over the next 20 years.  The modest war-time budget had an effect on the energy sector; 
with infrastructure development stalling, Iranian oil revenues declined sharply.  Between 1991 
and 1993 the government‘s revenue from oil dropped from 20 billion to 14.9 billion.93   
It was in this context that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was faced with the 
immediate need for a new source of relevance.  With the war over and the Artesh regaining its 
position as the state military institution, the Guards were in a precarious position with regard to 
their survival.   The organization‘s operations were a burden on the IRI‘s state budget and many 
viewed the Guards with distrust, fearing their politicization.
94
  Ironically, it was President 
Rafsanjani who gave the Guards a role that would not only ensure their survival as an 
organization, but their growth into a multidimensional institution.  Rafsanjani tackled both of the 
aforementioned problems with one solution: give the IRGC leadership of post-war development 
and reconstruction efforts.
95
  The IRGC was at odds with the Rafsanjani camp in the early 
nineties and by encouraging the Pasdaran to focus on the economy and infrastructure, Rafsanjani 
was hoping to distract and remove the IRGC as a political burden.
96
  This move also served 
Rafsanjani‘s larger mission to get government agencies access to business ventures in order to 
generate their own income.
97
  Additionally, with the Artesh growing back into a position of 
strength and there was no need for two militaries to operate parallel one another.  Rafsanjani 
feared the Pasdaran and the potential challenge that it posed to his presidency and the rule of the 
clerics but at the same time, the new Supreme Leader lacked the credibility of his predecessor 
and ended up relying heavily on the Guards for support, giving the association a long leash 
politically and economically.
98
  These motivating factors that led Rafsanjani and the Supreme 
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Leader to give the Guards a role in the economy ended up providing the vehicles through which 
the IRGC was able to gain political influence in the later decades.
99
   
The interests of the Guards in the post-revolution context had changed in light of the fact 
that they needed a new source of legitimacy.  Iran‘s constitution designates the IRGC as a 
security force that exists to protect the revolution, the regime and its ideology.
100
  Without the 
common enemy that Iraq represented, the IRGC had to find a new means of ensuring its 
longevity.  The constitution of the Islamic Republic does mandate that, in times of peace, the 
personnel and equipment of the military forces would be used in development of education and 
infrastructure.  
―In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel and technical equipment of 
the Army in relief operations, and for educational and productive ends, and the 
Construction Jihad, while fully observing the criteria of Islamic justice and ensuring that 
such utilization does not harm the combat-readiness of the Army‖101. 
Without affecting the combat-readiness of the forces, the IRGC would be permitted by the 
constitution to take a role in the post-war reconstruction.
102
 
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Rafsanjani gave the IRGC control of one of Iran‘s 
largest economic foundations, Bonyad-e Mostazafen. The Mostazafen foundation was created 
from the remnants of several smaller foundations that were managed under the Shah; the assets 
of those foundations were consolidated under the umbrella of the newly created Mostazafen 
Foundation which has since become the largest of Iran‘s foundations.103  The move that was 
initially meant to serve the goals of the Rafsanjani administration quickly became an end in itself 
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for the IRGC.  The ability to produce its own operating budget through its economic ventures 
gave the Guards the autonomy from the ruling regime that it needed to become integrated into 
the nation‘s political landscape.  The bonyads served as mechanisms for gaining not only 
political leverage, but social influence.  They did not have a unified strategic goal at the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, but the Pasdaran did have fundamental needs as an organization: funding and 
legitimacy.  Had the Guards simply been allowed to remain an essentially unemployed military 
force tied to the regime, they would have failed to achieve either of these goals.  Given a hand in 
the economy of the state, however, the IRGC was able to not only fund their operations, but 
invest for future growth.  Simultaneously, control of the bonyads provided the opportunity to 
garner support from the rural lower classes in Iranian society, an inconspicuous but nevertheless 
important demographic in Iranian politics.     
In addition to controlling one of Iran‘s largest foundations, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps has made a name for itself across the world as a giant construction and 
infrastructure development conglomerate.  With the encouragement of President Rafsanjani, the 
IRGC took control of factories that, during the revolution, had been confiscated.
104
  From these 
small beginnings the Guards built headquarters for reconstruction that became known as 
gharargah sazandegi khatam alanbia, or Ghorb.
105
  What is now called Khatam al-Anbiya is one 
of the country‘s largest contractors in industrial and development projects.106  The organization is 
a conglomerate of agriculture, industry, mining, construction and transportation companies and is 
the IRGCs major engineering arm, as well.  Khatam al-Anbiya operates using the resources of 
the IRGC, including volunteer labor from the Basij forces.  As a result, the subsidiary companies 
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of Khatam al-Anbiya are able to bid well below its competitors for government contracts, 
although the bidding process is often waived in favor of Khatam al-Anbiya anyway.
107
   
Where the bonyads provide funding opportunities for the IRGC, Khatam al-Anbiya 
provides legitimacy.  Students of legitimacy will know that legitimacy it is achieved through one 
or more of three avenues: religious right, economic product or coercion.
108
  The IRGC lacks 
religious right as a source of social acceptance the more it becomes involved in economic 
ventures; but simultaneously the subsidiary companies of Khatam al-Anbiya subsidize the loss of 
religious credibility with economic validity by providing infrastructure, gas, and other economic 
development to underprivileged regions in Iran.
109
  Political groups and economic competitors 
have issued complaints with regard to the monopolization of entire economic sectors by the 
IRGC, but the Guards are viewed favorably by those in the rural and underprivileged regions of 
Iran who benefit from the economic development that the Guards oversee.  The presence of the 
IRGC and the Basij in the rural regions of Iran produces an additional benefit in allowing the 
Guards to proactively prevent popular uprisings against the state.  These uprisings are common 
even today among ethnic and religious minorities and the regional presence of the IRGC and the 
Basij acts as deterrence and prevents collective organization.    
Many inside Iran and internationally accuse the Guards of involvement, and in some 
cases oversight of, Iran‘s black market trade.110  This accusation is as difficult to substantiate as 
it is to refute, however it is likely to have some validity.  Political figures such as Mehdi Karrubi, 
speaker of the Sixth Majlis under President Khatami, have accused the Guards of using their 
access to trade ports to import illegal goods such as alcohol and narcotics.  There is, in fact, a 
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vast quantity of illegal goods in Iran, also including satellite dishes and cigarettes, and many 
support the accusation against the IRGC with the argument that only the Guards have to 
influence and means necessary to carry out such a vast smuggling operation.
111
   
The objectives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can only be evaluated through 
the public statements of its representatives and the observation of the actions that the 
organization and the companies and individuals associated with it take.  Public statements 
regarding the goals of the IRGC are consistently centered on the theme of Islamic unity and 
development of the Islamic Republic.  Their actions, however, suggest some alternative interests.  
Two activities of the Guards in particular highlight the goals of the IRGC and the probability that 
those include economic control and social relevance.  Among the Guards‘ many large 
development projects in the underdeveloped provinces, the largest and most significant has been 
the 900 km long gas pipeline running through Asaluyeh, Bushehr and ending in Iranshahr.
112
  
The delivery of natural gas itself is important to the underprivileged in the remote regions of the 
country, but the jobs and capital that the project provides is far more significant.  The Basij play 
a large role in this ―peace pipeline‖ project and perform labor on a mostly volunteer basis.113  
While the Guards profit financially from the project, the social capital that is earned from the 
development of the Peace Pipeline is equally important.  Another of the IGRC‘s more recent 
actions that demonstrate the organization‘s interests in economic monopoly was the 2004 seizure 
of operations at the Imam Khomeini Airport.
114
  A Turkish firm had won a bid to administer 
operations at the airport and the IRGC, clearly opposed to the idea, used its own air force to shut 
down the airport on the day it opened.
115
  In addition to pursuing control of the transportation 
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industry, it is thought that the IRGC wished to manage airport operations in order to protect their 
own smuggling activities.   
Regardless of their motives, the Guards have thrived in their economic dealings and have 
developed to the point of being possibly the most influential patronage network in Iran.  The 
Pasdaran do not openly declare their economic agenda, but their market and financial activities 
make it clear that the association of key individuals is seeking a broad influence in the Iranian 
market economy with holdings not just in construction, but in agriculture, transportation, 
industry and tourism.  The Bonyad-e Mostazafen alone is estimated to represent at least 10 
percent of the government‘s budget and has an estimated value of $3 billion.116  These 
institutions possess a great degree of autonomy and receive their authority from the clerics, not 
the government.  Bonyad-e Mostazafen today is the second largest commercial enterprise in Iran 
and it owns and operates approximately 350 affiliates and subsidiaries in a wide variety of 
industries.
117
  The Foundation earmarks 50% of its profits for charity, providing food and 
housing to the needy.   
The IRGC has an agenda that includes gaining control of construction and engineering 
enterprises that place the Guards in positions of patronage to Iranians from rural farmers to 
powerful politicians.
 118  
The IRGC stands to gain a great deal more than just financial wealth, as 
they become a key source of patronage.  Still a defender of the revolution, still the ―people‘s 
army‖, the group is nevertheless accused of nepotism, corruption and cronyism in their economic 
dealings.
119
  They has a vested interest in the economy, but this is not their primary role.  The 
organization risks its own reputation, however, in its economic gains; the Pasdaran receives its 
authority from the clerics, who receive their legitimacy from the people.  If the people become 
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suspect of the IRGC‘s dealings and connections, this becomes a concern of the clerics as well.  
The influence of the IRGC in the market economy may account for the growing tension between 
the clerics and the IRGC and may also hasten the Pasdaran‘s need to separate itself from the 
clerics and find its own source of legitimacy.    
 
Means and Capabilities 
 
As earnest as the ideology of that the IRGC subscribes to, it is constrained in its 
objectives by the resources available and the social and cultural context in which it operates.  In 
spite of its strategic military mishaps in the years during the Iran-Iraq war, the IRGC has grown 
into a pragmatic and self-serving organization which can be relied upon to act rationally within 
its own means to achieve its interests.  It is a necessary trait of a developing institution to seek to 
expand its own means, ensure its growth and bring security and legitimacy to its existence.  
While the Pasdaran was created to serve the clerics as a light infantry force, it was presented with 
the opportunity at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war to become much more than that, replacing the 
Artesh.  In this position, the IRGC was able to acquire other military branches and merge with 
various militias with compatible ideologies.  Within only a few years, the light infantry force had 
grown into a developed military with naval and air force capabilities.
 120
  Young as the force was 
and, perhaps pitifully equipped, the IRGC proved in these early years that it was capable of 
expanding its own usefulness to the regime and itself.   
Contemporary analysts often describe the ascension of the IRGC militarily, the growing 
economic monopoly and the increased autonomy from its paternal regime as a silent coup.
121
 The 
evolution of the IRGC was less guided and calculated than a coup is usually assumed to be, but 
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its development over the past three decades has indeed brought it further away from its origins as 
a protector of the revolution and closer to a parallel, if not competing, economic, political and 
social institution.  The evolution occurred in stages which began with its overshadowing the 
Artesh in the 1980s, the growth of its economic ventures and monopoly of reconstruction efforts 
in the 1990s, and the challenge to both the reformist and traditionalist political groups in the 
Majlis and executive political leadership beginning in the late 90s and taking off after 
Ahmadinejad‘s election in 2005.   
 
Bonyads 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the IRGC‘s primary vehicle in the pursuit of their 
economic interests was the bonyads which had been entrusted to their leadership by Rafsanjani, 
as a means for placating and reducing the potential IRGC political threat. The first ventures of 
the IRGC in the Iranian economy were small; a few factory warehouses were purchased.  Two 
companies were established initially, the Moavenat khodkafaee (headquarters of self-sufficiency) 
and Moavenat bassazi (headquarters of reconstruction).
122
  In following with their new mission, 
the IRGC was given government no-bid contracts for the development and reconstruction of 
Iran‘s infrastructure. 123  The country‘s transportation and utilities services were in shambles after 
the eight-year war and the opportunity for profit in development was vast.  The IRGC 
accumulated wealth rapidly during this period, bringing them not only further prospects for 
economic ventures but also autonomy from the political regime that had appointed the IRGC to 
the position of management of the bonyads.
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Rafsanjani had appointed Mohsen Rafighdoost, the former Minister of the Revolutionary 
Guards, as the head of the Bonyad-e Mostazafen.  Rafighdoost served as in this capacity until 
1999, at which point another IRGC heavy-weight, Mohammad Forouzandeh, was appointed.  
Both men were required to give up their military roles in order to take on management of the 
Bonyad-e Mostazafen, but the continued to conduct business for the benefit of their IRGC 
brothers.
125
   
Industries 
 
In addition to the Bonyad-e Mostazafen, the IRGC‘s construction conglomerate, Khatam al-
Anbiya, was awarded contracts from damn building to railway reconstruction.
126
 Khatam al-
Anbiya was created in 1990 and would continue to earn large contracts from the IRI government 
throughout the decade. The business conglomerate earned itself some negative publicity through 
its growing monopoly and autonomy and in 1999 the reformist speaker of the Majlis, Mehdi 
Karrubi, issued a report that exposed the illegal dealings of the IRGC including the unauthorized 
operation of as many as sixty docks in the country.
127
  Since the 2005 elections, the Guards have 
increased their control over smuggling, managing the arrival of contraband in Iran, as well.  An 
estimated 30% of Iranian imports enter the country illegally through the smuggling activities of 
the IRGC.
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Khatam al-Anbiya currently owns 812 subsidiary companies and manages government 
contract worth billions of dollars. The IRGC benefits financially from the profits that these 
lucrative government contracts generate as well as politically from their influence in industries 
such as oil and gas and nuclear energy.  Khatam al-Anbiya owns and operates oil fields as well 
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as transport pipelines and the degree to which the company is invested in the energy sector 
highlights the importance of the energy industry for Iran‘s foreign and domestic policy.129   Iran 
has been seeking energy independence for decades and, if the IRGC is seeking autonomy from 
its paternal regime then control of the energy sector could be the key to that independence.    
The Revolutionary Guard‘s economic influence gained momentum after the election of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005.  Under Ahmadinejad the IRGC‘s construction 
conglomerate, Khatam al-Anbiya, was given precedence during the privatization of former state 
initiatives.  This movement towards privatization was announced immediately following 
Ahmadinejad‘s 2005 victory and amounted to the transition of $120 billion worth of public 
assets into private ownership.
130
  The company grew in its energy sector enterprises with an 
increase in government contracts for the development of gas fields and transit lines.  The role of 
the Guards in the Iranian economy comes as no surprise given that Iran is seeking to privatize at 
the same time as keeping its enterprises at home in order to avoid foreign control.
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The IRGC, however, has limited experience in economic ventures and the increasing 
number of no-bid contracts awarded to the Guard‘s business conglomerates by Ahmadinejad‘s 
administration has garnered some criticism at home and abroad.   In 2008 the IRGC‘s Khatam al-
Anbiya was awarded a contract without bidding to complete phases 15 and 16 of the South Pars 
oil field development, a $2.5 billion project.  In 2010 Khatam al-Anbiya, far behind schedule, 
announced ―financial difficulties‖ facing the project and requested an additional $1 billion which 
was distributed from Iran‘s Foreign Reserve Fund amid much controversy.  In 2009, the IRGC 
drew more negative publicity when it won a bid for the purchase of 51% of shares in stock for 
Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI).
132
  The sale of the shares was prompted by 
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President Ahmadinejad‘s privatization of a number of state run companies.  Media agencies in 
Iran were clearly aware of the significance of the IRGC owning the majority of shares in what is 
Iran‘s largest telecommunications company and the organization was portrayed in a less than 
favorable light.   
The Guards‘ combined investments make the association of individuals and business the 
largest investor in Tehran‘s stock market.  Most experts calculate that the IRGC controls at least 
one-third of the economy of the Islamic Republic.
133
  Individual IRGC members, such as 
Mohammad Forouzandeh exercise their influence through bonyads, such as the Mostazafen, 
Shahid, and the Nur Foundations
 to serve their own interests, as well as the Guard Corps‘.  The 
unfortunate consequence of the Guards‘ growing economic presence is an increased pressure 
from the United States and other western countries to sanction the company‘s under the control 
of the IRGC.
134
  The US Treasury Department has identified a handful of IRGC individuals who 
play roles in the organization‘s foreign military wing and who are accused of supporting 
terrorism; these individuals are effectively blacklisted from doing business with the United States 
and those cooperating with it.  In addition, after years of lobbying, the US Treasury Department 
has succeeded in placing Khatam al-Anbiya itself on a list designating the organization as one 
that participates in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems; as 
a member of this exclusive group, the company is unable to do business with American 
companies or individuals.  In 2008 the European Union passed similar sanctions on Khatam al-
Anbiya.
135
 For those without access to primary sources of information inside the IRGC, the US 
Treasury Department‘s obvious concern sends a strong message about the role that the Guards 
play in Iranian economy.  Prolific though they are in the investment and development markets, 
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there is little about the role of the Guards that is legitimate and esteemed.  Within Iran, 
companies like Khatam al-Anbiya are perceived to be in pursuit of goals outside of their mandate 
to protect the revolution.  Ahmadinejad‘s exclusive relationship as evidenced by the no-bid 
contracts given to the Guards‘ companies is damaging the administration as well as the public 
image of the IRGC.  Capital investments are a necessity for any institution seeking to grow and 
expand its influence, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is challenged to find a balance 
in which it does not overstep the thin line of acceptable commercial conduct in pursuit of its own 
interests. 
 
Sanctions 
Prior to the beginning of economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
classification of many IRGC owned businesses as terrorist supporting organizations, the financial 
institutions connected with the Guards engaged in business deals with European countries such 
as Germany.  Wirth and Seli, German and Italian companies respectively, had sold tunnel boring 
products to subsidiary companies of the IRGC with the understanding that they would be used 
for civilian purposes.  The IRGC itself has a monopoly on tunneling and underground rail 
systems contracts, a market that it has cornered with its security credentials
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The resources sold to the IRGC owned companies by German and Italian companies 
were used specifically for Iran‘s water tunnel projects in Ghormroud and Kerman provinces and 
were exempt from existing embargos, since they were part of infrastructure development.  The 
European countries have been accused, nevertheless, of aiding the country in its nuclear 
development plans since the underground tunnels that are dug exclusively by IRGC construction 
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conglomerates could be a part of the larger construction plans for nuclear bunkers.  While trade 
with Iran is now severely restricted by Western countries, in the past the IRGC was suspected of 
using supplies that appeared to be intended for infrastructure development for purposes designed 
instead for their nuclear activities.  In 2010 the EU as a whole still constituted Iran‘s second 
largest trading partner.   
In response to the economic sanctions against Iran as a means of pressuring the country 
to end its nuclear development program, President Ahmadinejad has been forced to make some 
dramatic economic changes.
137
  In most cases the representatives of the IRGC are known to do 
what is in their best interests; in this case, however, Ahmadinejad is being forced to act in the 
best interests of the country despite the fact that it might tarnish his own political reputation.  For 
decades, Iran has provided economic subsidies to the poor for gasoline and food staples.  
Ahmadinejad himself brought new programs to the country that benefited the poor, his key 
constituency, such as low interest loans, debt cancellation and general social welfare 
programs.
138
  In the current economic climate, however, these programs have become 
unsustainable and in order to lower the impact of sanctions on the state budget, the President 
announced in 2010 that subsidies on staple goods for the underprivileged would be reduced.  At 
the time that the Majlis approved the reduction, subsidies were expected to cost about $100 
billion per year.  In December of 2010 the subsidy on gasoline, an entitlement that Iranians have 
come to rely on, was lifted amid protests and general popular disapproval.  Simultaneously, the 
president attempted to raise taxes on bazaar merchant incomes by as much as 70%; strikes and 
protests eventually succeeded in forcing the president to lower the increase to 15% but the 
overall impact of the tax increase has been disillusionment among the merchant classes with the 
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Ahmadinejad administration.
139
  In this sense, the economic sanctions imposed by the Western 
nations are working to put pressure on the current government.  However, Ahmadinejad does not 
represent all of the IRGC and although he is a champion for the country‘s nuclear development 
program, he is not solely responsible for it and he does not have the power to put a stop to it.  
Although the current administration and the people of Iran may be suffering as a result of the 
economic sanctions, it does not necessarily mean that the IRGC is suffering.   
In fact, it is possible that the organization is actually growing stronger as a result of the 
economic hardship.  The Guards control so much of how business is operated in Iran and the 
unofficial methods through which trade is conducted are immune to the official economic 
sanctions.  The black market, which the IRGC is expected to control almost entirely, is damaged 
by economic sanctions about as much as the mafia was damaged by Prohibition in the United 
States in the 1920s; the more that access any marketable good is restricted by the law, the more 
it‘s trade will be driven underground, profiting those who run the black market trade.  The 
United States‘ instinctive reaction to political developments, such as the revelation of a plot to 
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, is to slap new sanctions on Iran.
140
  
Unfortunately, these punitive reactions are likely to strengthen the individuals and groups 
associated with the IRGC groups that organized the plot. 
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CHAPTER 4: IRGC POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
 
Political Landscape 
 
Iran‘s first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was an advocate for the political 
neutrality of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; however, Khamenei‘s Iran is vastly 
different from the one that Ayatollah Khomeini had envisioned.  In Ayatollah Khomeini‘s belief 
system, the politicization of the IRGC would undermine the battle readiness of the forces and he 
warned forces to ―stay away from political parties, groups and fronts‖ and to ―steer clear of 
political games.‖141  In spite of the first Supreme Leader‘s intentions, the course of events that 
took place in the Islamic Republic put the IRGC on a trajectory bound for significant political 
involvement.  This chapter will investigate the evolution of the organization that led to the 
politicization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the influence that the Guards have 
in the country‘s political establishment today.  In order to shed light on the influence of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran it is necessary 
to draw a summary of the contemporary Iranian political system.    
Iran‘s formal organizational structure is easily represented in charts and graphs 
illustrating symbolic seats of power; however, this illustration would not be adequate in 
describing the actual political order in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The political establishment 
is well furnished with a variety of religious and bureaucratic institutions, with the clergy holding 
executive power and the democratically elected Majlis overseeing legislative procedures.  These 
political institutions were designed with the intention balancing the two predominant political 
philosophies of the time: (1) the velayet-e faqih and (2) the democratic ideals that ended the reign 
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of the Shah.
142
  Ayatollah Khomeini‘s concept of the divinely appointed guardianship paved the 
way for the theocracy that would become the foundation of Iran‘s political system, but the people 
who were responsible for the toppling of the Shah‘s regime were not unified in support of this 
ideal and the Ayatollah saw the need for compromise and gave his blessing for the establishment 
of the democratically elected Majlis and presidency.  In doing so, Ayatollah Khomeini did not 
sacrifice totalitarian power, which was still delegated to the office of the Supreme Leader, but he 
did successfully mitigate the high opportunity and financial costs of imposing a religious 
dictatorship on an unwilling population.  The Supreme Leader himself is elected by a body of 86 
clerics, known as the Assembly of Experts, to whom the Supreme Leader, in theory, answers to.  
The members of the Assembly of Experts are elected from a vetted list of candidates and serve 
eight year terms.  Members of the parliament, or Majlis, are also democratically elected; 
however, these candidates are vetted by an institution called the Council of Guardians.  The 
Council of Guardians has twelve non-elected members and the body of clerics is responsible for 
ensuring that the democratic system does not grow overly eager and attempt to take full 
autonomy from the Clerics.    
Within these state political structures there is little or no ideological unity.  Iran‘s 
political order is polycentric and multidimensional, with authority and legitimacy coming from a 
variety of sources and ideological backgrounds.  Political processes are both dynamic and 
opaque, making a confident analysis of the sources of power in the country difficult.  Some 
analysts would describe the system as chaotic, but this would be incorrect as there is indeed 
order to the Iranian political system; this order is simply not structured in the typical Western 
understanding of organizational systems.  Legitimacy, a topic that will be investigated further in 
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the following chapter, can be derived from popular approval based on economic output, popular 
approval based on ideological grounds, or authoritarian power by coercive force.  Political 
systems in the modern era are often studied as either democratic or authoritarian.  Iran‘s system 
embodies both categories, hosting a popularly elected bureaucracy parallel to a divinely imposed 
theocracy that bridges the gap between the people and God.  The negotiated political order 
receives credit for the endurance of the Islamic Republic, thus far, but there are forces at constant 
struggle to polarize the sources of legitimacy towards democracy or authoritarianism.  The IRGC 
constitutes one of these forces of influence that are putting a strain on the balance of clerical 
coercion and popular participation.   
In the first decade, during the process of consolidating their military influence, the IRGC 
achieved their political goals through indirectly influencing political actors.  The Guards had no 
means of participating directly in politics, but as this was a time that the military organization 
was preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war and subsequently keeping their autonomy from the 
Artesh, legislative power was not on their agenda.  The tactics and means used to work in the 
best interest politically of the IRGC depend a great deal on the context in which the 
Revolutionary Guard is operating and the capabilities and resources available to them.  In the 
case of Lebanon, for example, spreading the revolution through military and covert means is 
essentially a task of sponsoring terrorism against the state of Israel.
143
  The best support that the 
IRGC is able to offer politically to those who support its own goals is funding.  Tangible support 
in the form of monetary aid is frequently transferred through proxies to political groups to 
countries in which the IRGC has an interest, developing bonds of solidarity between the IRGC 
and legislators.  Financial support of local political movements takes many forms including 
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supplementing political parties‘ campaign funds, paying salaries and recruitment bonuses and 
paying rent or other operational costs. 
144
 
In spite of the Supreme Leader‘s desires to see the IRGC as a politically neutral 
organization, a political mandate is inherent in the very foundation of the Guards‘ existence.  
Delegated with the task of protecting and continuing the revolution would inevitably become a 
mandate to suppress rival political factions whether they are motivated by ethnicity, ideology or 
politics.  The very existence of the IRGC quickly became a political issue and the directive to 
protect the revolution would necessitate the protection of the Guards themselves.  Rafsanjani, for 
example, warned against the radical character of the IRGC and took it upon himself to mitigate 
the danger posed by the organization by attempting to integrate them into the Artesh. As this 
proved to be a lengthy process, he gave the Guards a distraction in the form of control of certain 
bonyads and the mission to rebuild the country‘s infrastructure.  He also redirected military 
resources to the Artesh, leaving the IRGC with outdated equipment.
145
   The Guards put to good 
use their connections with the office of the Supreme Leader and managed to survive Rafsanjani‘s 
administration; however, they did lose some autonomy when the IRGC was consolidated under 
the Ministry of Defense Forces and Logistics (MODAFL) with the Artesh.  Today, both military 
branches answer to MODAFL, which in turn reports to the Supreme National Security Council.
 
146
   
Having successfully purged the IRI of the Shah‘s loyalists, the IRGC was consumed in 
the early 1990s with its struggle against the People‘s Mojahedin Organization (MKO).  In spite 
of the Supreme Leader‘s and Rafsanjani‘s efforts to keep the IRGC out of politics, the Guards 
held a handful of government positions.  More importantly, it was in this decade that the Guards 
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began speaking out against members of the political establishment.  Voicing their ideological 
position became increasingly important to the IRGC as the Reformist movement grew.  In 1996 
the commander of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezai, spoke during the Majlis election against the 
reformists, referring to the ―cancerous tumor of liberalism‖ that was taking over the country.‖147  
Clearly not enough to sway the voters, Rezai‘s comments went unheeded when, a year later, 
Reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was elected as Iran‘s fifth president. During the same 
year, Rezai was replaced by a more softly spoken and moderate Yayha Rahim Safavi as the 
leader of the IRGC and was promoted to be secretary of the Expediency Council.
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1997 marked a turning point in the political path of the IRGC.  Not only did the 
organization wrap up much of their domestic security affairs with the elimination of Shah 
loyalists and by ejecting the MKO from the country, but the Guards saw an increase in their 
economic footprint as well.  The Guards clearly saw themselves as having arrived at an age in 
which they were allowed to have a political voice, and they made no pretenses at supporting the 
Reformist administration.  The IRGC, in a unique show of unanimity, threw their support 
wholeheartedly behind the conservatives, at the time represented by Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri.
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The conservatives, politically sidelined by the Reformists, were unwilling to blatantly speak out 
against a movement that had clear popular support; therefore, hardliners relied on the IRGC to 
execute their mission to intimidate and persecute those in the reformist movement.
150
  The 
comparatively moderate leader of the IRGC, Safavi, used his position of influence to sabotage 
the efforts to reform Iran‘s political system.  Where Khatami loosened controls on media, the 
IRGC attacked newspapers and media channels and brought to court those who spoke out against 
the conservatives or the Guards themselves.  The Guards had little support in the form of 
 61 
 
political resources, but they held control of a significant portion of the economy and where that 
did not suffice, they made up for it with sensational rhetoric and intimidation.
151
  Since the 
conservative hard-liners were unwilling to risk their already weak footing with the public and 
Khatami‘s government was hesitant to take the battle to the Supreme Leader, the conflict was 
mainly fought between the Guards and the reformist-sympathizing newspapers.
152
  Khatami‘s 
election in 1997 marked a turning point for the IRGC‘s role in politics only in that it was given 
allowance to speak out in favor of the clerics, however the Guards did not hold any popular 
support from the voters themselves.  It was not until 2003 that the Guards were able to rally 
themselves into an active participant in the municipal and national electoral process.   
Khatami‘s ―dialogue of civilizations‖ and the hope that he provided to the West for a new 
Iran animated young IRGC members who were eager to take their battle to the political field.
153
  
Between 1997 and 2003 the Guards were limited to tactics of intimidation and the occasional 
murder of belligerent reformists, but in the municipal elections of 2003 the country saw for the 
first time the political weight that the Guards held when the little-known Ahmadinejad was 
elected as Tehran‘s mayor.  A member of the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (Abadgaran), 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a former Basij and a leader in the new neo-conservative movement.
 
154
  Two years after being named mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad was victorious in the race for 
president with almost 62% of the vote.  His well-run campaign has consistently targeting Iran‘s 
impoverished and disenfranchised, making frequent promises to that demographic to ―put oil 
money on the people‘s tables‖.155 
The entrance of the IRGC into the political field in the form of Ahmadinejad and the 
Abadgaran marked the beginning of a political realignment which may be partially responsible 
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for the success that Ahmadinejad and his supporters had.
 156
  The country seemed unprepared for 
the manifestation of a third contender in the political game.  The three contenders represented 
groups of men who were brought together more by shared experiences than by ideology; 
therefore it is difficult to outline the policy foundations of each.  There is frequent overlap in 
ideologies and, at least among the conservatives, conversions to neo-conservatism or reformist 
parties were not uncommon.  In the 1980s and 1990s the bipolar political structure had forced 
reformists and conservatives to the center in order to gain a significant majority of voter support; 
the manifestation of the neo-conservatives resulted in a realignment of loyalties and ideologies 
that developed as an overall re-polarization of all parties.  Today‘s political establishment 
features the following three prominent factions: conservatives, reformists, and neo-conservatives.   
 
Conservatives 
 
In the pre-2003 political landscape, conservatives were often defined as conservative 
pragmatists and conservative traditionalists.  Conservative traditionalists were those who held 
with the original ideology of the velayet-e faqih including the isolationist policies that were 
intended to maintain the Islamic Republic‘s independence from foreign interference and 
manipulation.
157
   Conservative traditionalists emphasize traditional values and lifestyle as well 
as cultural purity.  The well-known Association of Militant Clergy represents one of the largest 
groups of conservative traditionalists.
158
  Conservative pragmatists differ from traditionalists 
mainly in their support for the globalized market economy.  These conservatives encouraged Iran 
to take part in the global economy much in the same way that China has, without sacrificing its 
ideals.  Conservative pragmatists have no democratic leanings and have, in fact, mostly 
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reconsolidated with the traditionalists, now known as the Principalists, since the emergence of 
the Abadgaran.
159
     
 
Reformists 
 
In 1988 an ideological split in the Association of Militant Clerics resulted in the 
establishment of the Reformists political faction.  Inspired by Ali Shariati, who believed that 
Islam was compatible with modern political philosophies, the Reformists supported the 
democratization of Iran while retaining its Islamic identity.  Mehdi Karrubi and Mohammad 
Khatami are the champions of the Reformists and they base their political foundation on the 
virtues of economic and cultural openness and the loosening of controls on society.
160
  The 
Reformists spurred the political involvement of the IRGC and many analysts posit that the 
Reformist movement is dead, having never legitimized their platform with the necessary support 
of the Supreme Leader.   
Neoconservatives 
 
Neoconservatives compose themselves of what was formerly referred to as the ―radicals‖ 
and they are now established in the Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islam, or the Developers of Islamic 
Iran.
161
  Abadgaran, for short, is made of mostly of veteran IRGC and Basij members.  The name 
of the group intentionally seeks legitimacy in the role of the IRGC in the reconstruction of Iran 
in the post-war years.  The ideology, goals and strategies of the IRGC through their proxies in 
the government will be examined in the subsequent section, but it is important to note that not all   
IRGC members and veterans are in line with the Abadgaran movement.  Well known Guards 
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such as Mohsen Rezai do not align themselves with the neoconservatives; Rezai would rather 
consider himself a conservative traditionalist and ran against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 
presidential elections.
 162
  The IRGC exists as a group of members from a background of shared 
experiences and they rally around multiple key personalities, instead of just one.  For the IRGC 
members that make up Abadgaran, Ahmadinejad is one of these key personalities. He represents 
a patron, in the economic context and a leader in the political context.
 
 
 
Domestic Influence 
As a whole, the goals for the IRGC inherent in their constitutional founding are to 
protect, continue, and export the revolution.
163
  The mandate to continue the revolution is 
fundamentally political; in actuality, the IRGC is interested in protecting the revolution because 
it is represented by the clerics who enable the political and economic influence of the Guards.  
The IRGC would not promote or allow moderates or Reformists to gain political supremacy 
because these groups do not support the role of the Guards as the advocates of the revolution.  
The concern of the IRGC is not for the revolution itself, but rather for continuing the status quo 
in which they are allowed to continue the growth of influence into all sectors of Iranian political 
and economic life.  To summarize, the IRGC is not as concerned with revolutionary principles as 
it is with political positions.   
The clergy, recognizing the need of the IRGC to maintain the status quo,  returns support 
for the IRGC in part to maintain a degree of control over the organization and in part because the 
clergy need the military power and the Basij to enforce their authority.  Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei shows his support for the Guards through multiple appointments of IRGC 
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commanders into politically influential positions such as defense, economy and revolutionary 
committees, increasingly their influence in domestic and foreign policy and economic affairs
1
. 
Among these appointments include the current president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the 
head of the Supreme council of National Security, Ali Larijani; the head of state television and 
radio services, Ezzatolah Zarghami; and the head of the Expediency Council Mohsen Rezai.  As 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, Mohammad Forouzandeh resigned from his IRGC command 
post in order to head the influential Mostazafen Foundation, a position that he was formally 
appointed to by the Supreme Leader.  Each of these positions lends opportunities to influence 
policy making in domestically and abroad.  
Some analysts believe that the rise of the IRGC in politics has occurred as a part of the 
natural evolution of the careers of the Iran-Iraq War veterans.  There is not much to be suspicious 
about when a former military member matures and decides to go into politics. Since the IRGC is 
not a cohesive political party, nor can it even be considered a coalition, it is not effective to 
identify the strategic goals of the Guards as a single unit.  The competitive disunity within the 
IRGC is itself a feature of Iranian politics.  This section will investigate, instead, the goals and 
interests of key figureheads in the organization.  President Ahmadinejad is clearly an important 
figure in Iranian politics, both as the president of the IRI and as the leader of the coalition 
Abadgaran.  Mohsen Rezai has been a significant figure in the IRGC since the Revolution and 
the fact that he ran against Ahmadinejad in 2005 is a sign of the disunity in the organization and 
a clue to Rezai‘s competing interests.  Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, currently the mayor of Tehran, 
poses a potential challenge to the Abadgaran coalition in future presidential elections and as a 
former IRGC commander he represents a comparatively moderate voice among the Pasdaran.  
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Broad shared political interests could be attributed to key political IRGC figures, including the 
need to legitimize their own authority, delegitimize the clerics and flood the bureaucracy with 
those in the same patronage network- the IRGC.  Each key IRGC member takes different 
approaches to achieving these goals, as will be demonstrated in the next section.  The three 
aforementioned IRGC leaders have been chosen as representatives of three factions within the 
IRGC; Rezai represents a traditional conservative position, Ahmadinejad is the leader of the 
neoconservative camp and Qalibaf falls somewhere in between the two as a pragmatic 
conservative.   
Some analysts and scholars of the Islamic Republic of Iran have hypothesized that the 
neoconservative movement represents the political goals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps.  Assigning specific political goals to the IRGC as a single unit is not possible and it is 
inaccurate to describe the neoconservatives as representative of the IRGC.  The Abadgaran 
coalition itself is made up of current or former IRGC members, but that is not to say that all 
IRGC members identify themselves with Abadgaran, the primary political vehicle for the 
neoconservatives.  Although not likely to associate themselves with Reformists, IRGC members 
could be placed all along the spectrum of conservative political loyalties ranging from 
conservative traditionalists to neo conservatives; those in the middle such as Qalibaf would 
easily qualify as pragmatic conservatives.  
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
Coming from an underprivileged background, Mahmud Ahmadinejad studied at the Iran 
University of Science and Technology in Tehran.  He was a Basij during the Iran-Iraq war and 
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served in a number of administrative posts in West Azerbaijan. In 2003 he was surprisingly 
appointed as Mayor of Teheran and two years later, he won the presidential election, beating 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 62% of the vote.
164
 Ahmadinejad has consistently used his 
impoverished background as a political tool for garnering social support; his trademark khaki 
suit is noticeably cheap and symbolizes to the public that he considers himself a humble equal to 
those who elected him to power.  As an individual, he has touted human rights and is a voice for 
the underprivileged and oppressed.  His political rhetoric in the 2005 race for presidential office 
promised to address social injustice, combat corruption and provide for the impoverished.  After 
taking office, Ahmadinejad lived in his own home until security forces insisted that he move to 
the presidential palace, where the president promptly replaced the ornate furniture with less 
expensive décor.  The source of jokes and ridicule among his political competitors, Ahmadinejad 
won invaluable support from the rural and less privileged in Iran.  The man is notably fervent in 
his Muslim beliefs, though he may be considered a radical even to some of the more devout 
Shi‘ites.  
It is possible that Ahmadinejad‘s landslide victory against Rafsanjani in 2005 could be 
attributed to his appeal to the poor and rural voters, however many have also accused 
Ahmadinejad‘s Abadgaran coalition of using less than ethical means to secure victory.165  
American and UK overseers declared that the election did not meet the free and fair standards of 
democracy and the Interior ministry received as many as 300 electoral fraud complaints in 
Tehran alone.  Although their methods are unknown, the results indicate that the IRGC has the 
means available to violate electoral rules without any legal consequences.  The Reformist 
Karrubi, who also ran in the 2005 elections, publicly accused the IRGC of interfering with the 
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roll results; these accusations went unaddressed by the IRGC or Abadgaran and Khamenei 
supported Ahmadinejad, claiming that the elections results were a ―profound humiliation‖ for the 
United States.
166
   
As for legitimizing their authority, the Ahmadinejad camp appeals to both the material 
needs of the underprivileged and the faith of the Iranian people.  Ahmadinejad‘s political 
approach emphasizes the Iranian peoples‘ right to nuclear power and anti-Western, American 
and Israeli sentiments.  The Supreme Leader‘s support of Ahmadinejad was likely a result of his 
highly conservative political stance; his history as a former Basij lends some credibility to 
Ahmadinejad but is not enough to base a campaign on.  In order to become a candidate for 
political office, aspiring politicians must pass the judgment of the Guardian council.  
Ahmadinejad and his competing fellow IRGC veteran brothers likely received their support from 
the council based more on their conservative politics than their IRGC roots.  In the 2005 
presidential elections both Ahmadinejad and Rezai emphasized their conservative political 
stances, hoping to appeal to hard-liners and to gain support from the clerical regime.  
Ahmadinejad relied heavily on the hard-line message to maintain political legitimacy during his 
campaign and this approach is shaping the evolution of the IRGC itself, widening the schisms 
between neoconservative IRGC members and pragmatic conservatives IRGC members.   
Although he pandered to the conservative clergy‘s ideals in order to gain their political 
support, having won his victory Ahmadinejad quickly showed signs of moving away from 
clerical control.  The first evidence of Ahmadinejad‘s dissent was in his choice for vice 
president.  Ahmadinejad wanted Esfandiar Mashaei in the position and Khamenei disapproved, 
proposing that Mashaei should manage the Pilgrimage Organization; Ahmadinejad refused and 
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appointed Mashaei.  The conflict ended only when Mashaei himself resigned from the position 
of Vice President.  Instead of backing down, Ahmadinejad publicly declared his displeasure with 
the Supreme Leader in a letter and appointed Mashaei as his own special advisor.  The 
disagreement between the President and the Supreme Leader over political appointments was the 
first of many.  More recently, Ahmadinejad attempted to dismiss several officials that had been 
appointed by the Supreme Leader as ―babysitters‖ and, when the Supreme Leader reinstated 
these officials, Ahmadinejad boycotted political meetings for almost two weeks straight. The 
Ahmadinejad camp and the Clerics clearly have differing political goals, but both parties find 
that it is still in their best interests  to support one another, at least in rhetoric if not in practice.  
The Supreme Leader is wary against the IRGC achieving too much political and economic 
influence and Ahmadinejad is not keen on playing the submissive puppet that the Supreme 
Leader expects from the President of the Islamic Republic.   
Upon taking office in 2005, Ahmadinejad gave most of his cabinet positions to former or 
current Guards in the interior, intelligence, defense and oil ministries.  Ahmadinejad has been 
using political appointments to exercise his political influence in the context of the clergy-
controlled political landscape; but the appointments serve a simultaneous purpose of reinforcing 
his own influence not just in the big political sphere, but in his own political networks as well.   
During the Iran-Iraq War, the members of the IRGC formed bonds of social allegiance that 
remain an integral part of the social system thirty years later.  The appointment of fellow Guards 
to economic or political positions does not immediately suggest a conspiracy to control the 
system, but may rather simply be the product of the patronage system in which a favor is granted 
in exchange for social capital.  With the growing number of Guards in political positions, the 
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clergy necessarily feel pressured by what they view as interference.  Likewise, when the 
presidential administration, increasingly dominated by IRGC veterans, has an appointment of a 
non-Pasdaran member forced into their ranks, the consensus is generally that the clerics are 
interfering in their affairs.  President Ahmadinejad has boldly taken steps to rid his 
administration of this non-IRGC presence; for example, in 2009 the president dismissed 
Intelligence Minister Hojjatal Islam Ghollam Hosssein Mohseni-Ejei, a man strongly opposed to 
the IRGC‘s growing influence and backed by the clerics.  This was the first of many more battles 
between the President and the clergy using political appointments, and dismissals, as vehicles for 
executing political influence.   
 
Mohsen Rezai 
Mohsen Rezai, a conservative politician with a PhD in economics, ran against Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections.  Rezai was the commander of the IGRC for 
sixteen years, from 1981-1997, at which point he left the Guards to become the Secretary of the 
Expediency Council.  Rezai pulled out of the 2005 campaign before election day, but ran again 
in the disputed 2009 elections.  He has expressed his disapproval of the president‘s immoderate 
rhetoric about the country‘s nuclear program and has suggested that Iran use a more sensible 
approach with regard to its nuclear policy.  He has directly accused President Ahmadinejad of 
being too aggressive, although this is not a critique that the President himself likely perceived as 
adverse to his reputation.   
The most important feature about Rezai and his political campaigns is his stance on the 
West.  Not only does Rezai believe that Ahmadinejad‘s lack of moderation and overly aggressive 
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attitude is detrimental to the West, but he has stated that the Obama Administration represents an 
opportunity for Iran to work with the West towards better relations and cooperation in Iran‘s 
pursuit of nuclear energy capabilities. His political platform for much of his career has been 
based on his message of moderation.  Far from being a Reformist, Rezai is considered a 
conservative principalist.  He does not advocate wavering on the issue of nuclear development, 
but rather suggests that a more moderate approach should be used.
167
  Rezai denies that the 
IRGC is working towards the militarization of Iran and says, instead, that politicians such as 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who he notes served only a few months at the front line in the Iran-Iraq 
War, as well as Iranian civilians, are attempting to militarize the country.
168
  His critique of the 
Reformist candidates in 2009, Mehdi Karrubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, is equally harsh, 
believing them to be too passive.  Still the Secretary of the Expediency Council at the time of 
this writing, Mohsen Rezai holds a prominent position on Interpol‘s Wanted List for his role in 
the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
 
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf 
Like Rezai, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf began his career in the military and served as the 
Commander of the IRGC‘s Air Force.  During a short stint as the commander of the Law 
Enforcement Forces, Qalibaf made enemies of several hard-line paramilitary groups such as 
Ansar e-Hezbollah by cracking down on their vigilante activism.  Whereas Rezai is a seasoned 
military man and markets himself as such in the political field, Qalibaf‘s strengths are as a 
business man rather than a strategist.  He currently serves as the Mayor of Tehran, as position in 
which he has received much praise and commendation for his achievements.  Qalibaf‘s political 
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position falls much along the same lines as Rezai‘s in that he strongly criticizes the extremism of 
the Ahmadinejad camp and maintains that moderation in tone is more likely to achieve the goals 
of the Islamic Republic. He unapologetically supports Iran‘s nuclear development but also 
suggests that Iran should be able to carry out respectful diplomatic talks with the United States.   
Rezai and Qalibaf, running against each other and against Ahmadinejad, market 
themselves as conservatives, nevertheless devoutly loyal to the Supreme Leader, in the 2005 and 
2009 campaigns and their less radical rhetoric highlights the extremism of Ahmadinejad and his 
neoconservative cabinet.  In 2009, however, the race did not come down to a battle between the 
neoconservatives and the pragmatic conservatives; it became a conflict between the 
―conservatives‖ and the ―reformists‖.  In such a situation, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
was in the position to decide whether to support a reformist candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, or 
a conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  The decision to support Ahmadinejad has led analysts 
to speculate that the Supreme Leader is in bed with the IRGC; however, with an understanding 
of the internal schisms within the association, it is clear that the Supreme Leader simply chose 
the lesser of two evils.  The Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad are far from amicable 
and, had the Supreme Leader been forced to choose between a neoconservative IRGC member 
and a pragmatic conservative IRGC member, his likely choice would have been the 
comparatively moderate pragmatic conservative.   
 
Foreign Influence 
 
If an analyst or scholar were to conduct an in depth analysis of the Revolutionary Guard‘s 
Foreign Policy approach towards, say, just Lebanon, then one might conclude that the IRGC 
bases its foreign affairs policy on a strong ideological conviction.  In contrast, however, one 
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might look at IRGC‘s actions in Iraq and conclude with confidence that the organization‘s 
foreign policy is based on a realist and geopolitical concern for its own security.  A careful 
examination of the Islamic Republic‘s foreign affairs reveals a genuine reliability in Iran‘s 
approach to each of its neighbors, but a baffling lack of consistency overall; one possible 
explanation for this is the disconnect between the IRGC‘s domestic political operations and its 
foreign policy operations.   
The foreign goals of the IRGC are simultaneously ideological and practical.  Primarily, 
the IRGC utilizes the Quds Force, its foreign military division, to spread the ideology of the 
velayat-e faqih..  The IRGC is compelled by the ideology of the Islamic revolution to spread its 
beliefs especially to other Shi‘a in the region, but also beyond its own neighborhood.169  This 
ideology is the banner of the Islamic Republic and it is an inherent directive of the constitution to 
broadcast the revolution outside of Iran.
170
  Shared religious beliefs are a significant variable that 
influences Iran‘s intervention abroad through covert and military means; though the IRGC itself 
may have alternative interests.  The following chart lists countries with the highest population of 
Shi‘a Muslims; of these eight, Iran is known to have covert operations in five: Pakistan, Iraq, 
Turkey, Yemen and Afghanistan.  
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Table 2 
Shi’a Muslim Population by Country 
 
Country 
Total 
Population 
% of Population-
Shia 
% of World Shi'a 
Population 
Iran 66-70 million 90-95% 37-40% 
Pakistan 17-26 million 10-15% 10-15% 
India 16-24 million 10-15% 9-14% 
Iraq 19-22 million 65-70% 11-12% 
Turkey 7-11 million 10-15% 4-6% 
Yemen 8-10 million 35-40% 5% 
Azerbaijan 5-7 million 65-75% 3-4% 
Afghanistan 3-4 million 10-15% 2% 
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Research suggests that the IRGC still holds on to some of its original ideological 
interests; take the case of Lebanon for example.  Very much unlike the relationship between Iraq 
and Iran, the nature of the relationship between Lebanon and Iran is not clandestine.  In Iraq, Iran 
has a healthy fear of igniting US and Coalition forces indignation over more obvious support of 
violent militancy and igniting an attack on the Islamic Republic from the uncomfortably close 
position of just next door.  In Lebanon, Iran and the IRGC are under no such obligation to remain 
sensitive to the United States‘ anti-terror sensibilities.  It is, therefore, a simpler task to ascertain 
the goals of the IRGC in Lebanon.  John Negroponte once stated that "at the center of Iran's 
terrorism strategy is Lebanese Hezbollah, which relies on Tehran for substantial portion of its 
budget, military equipment, and specialized training."
172
  
The IRGC‘s goal in Lebanon is a useful example of the remaining influence of ideology 
over the Guards.  Approximately 45-55% of Lebanon's Muslims are Shi'a, a fact that results in an 
automatic ideological link between the two.
173
  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is 
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obliged by its own nature to make an effort to spread its ideology abroad through the Quds 
Force, among other divisions of its organization.  Lebanon is of key importance to Iran's 
exportation of the Shi'a Revolution.  To date the IRGC has no greater foreign presence than in 
southern Lebanon where a large Shi'a community is located. Recruits have repeatedly claimed 
then when they went to Tehran for training they were taught not only how to fire a weapon or 
construct and IED, but were also instructed in the doctrine of Shi'a Islam and the velayat-e faqih 
principle.  In a religious sense Lebanon is the first outpost in Iran's attempts to spread their 
Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East.  
Lebanon itself is limited in the resources that it is able to provide Iran and Hezbollah is 
largely an importer of weapons and an exporter of training.  In terms of material resources, Iran 
has almost nothing to gain from its involvement in Lebanon.  Additionally, Iran's influence in 
Lebanon does not increase Iran's security in an international sense.  The financing and support of 
the terrorist networks in Hezbollah has been the source of diplomatic tension, to say the 
least.  Iran‘s interest in Lebanon appears to be largely based on the concept of exporting its Shi'a 
revolution to the rest of the world and to obstruct the continued development and assimilation of 
the state of Israel into the Middle East.   
The history of the relationship between Iran and Lebanon also involves Syria.  The first 
Lebanese War in the 1980s wreaked havoc on the once thriving nation, leaving Lebanon's 
government and economy in collapse and greatly reducing Syria's influence in the region.  It was 
around the same time period that the Islamic Revolution concluded and the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini began his rule of Iran.  Recognizing the opportunity to export its revolution 
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to the center of the Middle East and, with Syrian approval, Iran moved 2,500 IRGC troops in the 
Shi'a dominated Beqaa Valley of Lebanon.
174
  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was able 
to unite the warring Shi'a factions and establish Hezbollah, giving them money and training to 
fight Israel.  It was through the development of Hezbollah that two tactics of Shi'a terrorism 
developed: suicide bombing and hostage taking.  Hezbollah has since strengthened in southern 
Lebanon and continued its provocation of Israel while simultaneously building a history of 
dependence on Iran.   
Defending the Revolution 
 
In countries where religious beliefs are similarly aligned, ideological justification for 
foreign intervention is easy to come by.   More realistically, however, the IRGC‘s Quds Force 
acts assertively to undermine attempts to weaken the Iranian regime as well as preemptively to 
prevent a foreign opposition to the regime from provoking insurrection in Iran or more overtly 
attacking the regime militarily.  Potential foreign threats range from the state of Israel to the 
Coalition forces in Iraq.  Khamenei‘s foreign policy decisions are strongly influenced by his 
rigid distrust of the West, particularly the US; the Ayatollah accuses the United States of 
working to destabilize the regime and believes that Washington is single-handedly responsible 
for the uprisings following the June 2009 elections.
175
  Quds Force exists to spread the ideology 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran while securing the sovereignty of the regime.   
From a realist perspective there are institutional interests that may, in the IRGC‘s 
opinion, necessitate covert interference or influence in a foreign nation.  A list of Iran's export 
relationships (nations importing less than 3% of Iran's total export excluded) reveals that Iraq 
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and Afghanistan both share a significant portion of Iran's export volume; both nations are also in 
a state of great insecurity.  Promoting security or ensuring control when the foreign state has 
regained security is essential to the economic stability of Iran and, consequentially, the IRGC. 
Table 3 
Iran’s Export Relationships by Value 
 
Country Weight (Kg) Value (Rial) Value ($) % Value 
United Arab 
Emirates 
3,665,163,637 17,040,396,636,532 1,858,981,838 14.273 
Iraq 3,313,075,774 16,587,080,653,082 1,809,862,469 13.896 
China 6,772,455,047 9,107,122,159,571 992,551,828 7.621 
India 2,279,654,207 8,206,256,246,743 895,409,697 6.875 
Japan 1,495,686,825 5,978,327,663,083 652,322,022 5.008 
Italy 549,333,797 5,273,824,741,428 574,703,384 4.412 
Afghanistan 642,087,395 4,619,438,574,740 503,433,890 3.865 
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Iraq is a perfect case where the IRGC‘s interests go far beyond ideology.  Granted, 
sharing more than just a geographical border, the histories of Iran and Iraq are inextricably linked 
to one another socio-economically, historically and religiously.  The religious and ideological 
connection is a strong one, but not the only bond between these neighbors; the two countries 
depend on one another for economic stability, as well.  Iran and Iraq have the second and third 
largest oil reserves in the world, respectively.
177
  Most of Iran‘s onshore oil fields are located on 
Iraq‘s southern border and control and access to these oil resources in southern Iraq is crucial to 
the internal stability of Iran, which depends on oil exports for economic growth.
178
  At the end of 
2009 it was reported that Iran crossed the southeastern border of Iraq to take control of a well in 
the Fauqa oil field, which has an estimated 1.55 million barrels of oil reserves, because the well 
had failed to be purchased in an auction held by the Iraqi government.
179
  The well reportedly 
lies about a kilometer from the agreed-upon border between Iran and Iraq and yet, in spite of 
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complaints from Baghdad, Iran has thus far refused to remove the Iranian flag from the well and 
withdraw its 11 soldiers that now guard the well.
180
  This issue illustrates not only the fragility of 
the border between Iran and Iraq, but also the relative inability or unwillingness of Baghdad to 
take more coercive action to defend itself against Iran.  Inaction is likely the result of the current 
preoccupation of Iraqi forces with internal instability.  As long as Iraq is unstable politically, Iran 
will pay the price economically and will attempt to balance the cost by taking action either 
blatantly, as was the case with Well 4 in the Fauqa Field, or covertly. 
This case also illustrates the dilemma that Iran faces in its relationship with Iraq; the 
instability that has a great effect on the condition of Iran‘s economy also opens doors for Iran to 
assert influence in a manner that may not be possible in a state with greater security resources, 
stronger economic independence and a stronger sense of national identity and therefore greater 
resistance to ideological manipulation.   
In the case of Afghanistan, the IRGC‘s interest in the conflict-ridden state is largely 
based on topography.  On Iran's eastern border, the events in Afghanistan have a direct impact on 
Iran.  Afghanistan also provides a region of underdevelopment which gives Iranian companies 
opportunities to gain lucrative building contracts.  For instance, a road construction company 
partly owned by Qassem Suleimani recently received a major road construction project in an 
attempt to link Afghanistan's four major cities.  The key to Afghanistan in this sense is stability; 
a stable, Shi'a oriented Afghanistan is the sought after goal as it would keep their eastern border 
safe.   
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IGRC and Iranian influence in Afghanistan is pivotal to the security of their state.  The 
drug trade has dominated its border and has become a serious issue for the Iranian 
government.  Suleimani's first post in the IRGC was on this border attempting to intercept drug 
traffickers into Iran.  The drug trade which has allowed the Taliban to prosper also places large 
amounts of drugs within Iran's borders.  The UN Office of Drugs and Crime estimated in 2008 
the Iran could have as many as 1.8 million drug addicts.
181
   
The development of a Pakistani-funded Sunni Taliban in Afghanistan also was of interest 
to Iran.  This concern was further amplified by the arrival of American troops after September 
11th.  In Afghanistan, Iran appears to be attempting to use economic influence to bolster 
security; by injecting money into the country to build roads and other projects they are 
attempting to create an infrastructure dependent on Iran.  Iran also has some benefit in supporting 
the Taliban itself; a weakened Afghanistan cannot form an alliance with the United States against 
Iran, a threat that the Islamic Republic is perpetually aware of.    
Of increasing concern in the international realm are the growing ties between the IRGC 
and Venezuela.  Regionally separated, economically independent of one another and ethnically 
and religiously distinct, these two nations have very little to recommend them to one another as 
allies, and yet there has been a strengthening of the relationship between Iran and Venezuela 
since 2005.  The camaraderie that Iran and Venezuela share is based mainly on their anti-
American ideology.  Iran uses petro dollars as leverage against Venezuela while the Islamic 
Republic's own interests go beyond the economic or ideological spheres.  Iran's goal is to gain a 
geographically strategic advantage over the US by posing a threat to American borders that 
 80 
 
counterbalances the threat that Iran faces with the United States occupation of Iraq.
182
  Back in 
the ideological realm, it is possible that Ahmadinejad is also hoping to damage the relationship 
between Latin American countries and Israel.  Lastly, the IRGC might hope to build intelligence 
and terrorism networks in Latin America from which terrorist attacks might be launched against 
the United States.   
Most importantly, Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan president 
Hugo Chavez share revolutionary aspirations.  Both men are ruled by an anti-American ideology 
that paints every other issue with revolutionary interpretation and rhetoric.  Chavez has 
mentioned more than once that he has a vision of establishing new world hegemony with a union 
of the Arabs, Iranians and Latin Americans.
183
  Unlike Chavez's vision, Ahmadinejad envisions a 
Shi'ite union that courts Latin America because of the geographical advantage.   
Political Interests 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has a personal interest in Iraq to the extent that 
the organization‘s leaders believe that the Guards have a responsibility to protect neighboring 
country against the imperialist aspirations of the United States.  This perspective is characteristic 
of the ideology that the Islamic Republic is founded on; article 154 of the Iranian constitution 
declares: ―the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right 
of all people of the world.  Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of 
interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the freedom 
fighters against the oppressors in every corner of the globe.‖184  The Guards interpret the actions 
of the United States and the Coalition Forces as ―oppressive‖ and see Iraqis as freedom fighters.  
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As such, it is the obligation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard to defend the Iraqi nation against 
foreign aggression.   
As a fellow Shi‘a majority state, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a great deal of gain 
from public opinion when relations with neighboring Iraq are smooth and friendly.  An open 
relationship with Iraq is by no means crucial to the survival of the regime, as we‘ve seen through 
the Iran-Iraq war and the obvious health of the regime, to-date.  It would, nevertheless, be a 
desirable benefit for Iran if Iraq were to institute a system founded on the doctrine of velayat-e 
faqih.  The adoption by Iraq of such a system would not only improve Iran-Iraq relations but it 
would also add a great deal of legitimacy to Iran‘s system, which is currently in a state of crisis 
that is difficult to measure from the unprivileged perspective of being without access to classified 
intelligence.   
Taking into consideration the abundance of interests that the state of Iran and its regime 
have in the security, economic stability and political structure of Iraq, it is without a doubt that 
the IRGC has some motivation to take whatever measures are within its capabilities to gain and 
retain control of its neighbor‘s political and economic condition.  This has historically been 
achieved militarily, diplomatically and, of course, subversively. The foreign operations branch of 
the IRGC was founded under circumstances that were necessitated by the loss of diplomatic 
relations between Iran and Iraq‘s political regimes and has continued to grow, since.185   
Quds Force 
 
The history of the Quds Force is strongly, though not exclusively, influenced by the 
relationship between Iran and Iraq.  The IRGC division‘s first mission as a consolidated force 
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involved neighboring Iraq and since then it has not ceased to be a concern to the regime or the 
Quds Force.  In the 1980s and 1990s the IRGC formed close relationships with two Iraqi 
political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Islamic 
Dawah Party.  The Dawah and SCIRI parties are led and sponsored by prominent Shi'a figures 
from Southern Iraq.  They share ideological perspectives with Ayatollah Khomeini's regime but 
unlike SCIRI, the Dawah party is opposed to the principle of velayat-e faqih.
186
   
The IRGC was directly involved the founding of SCIRI and it filled positions with former 
Iraqi Shi‘a refugees that had fled to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.  SCIRI and its militant branch, 
the Badr Corps, recognized Ayatollah Khamenei as their Supreme Leader up until 2007 when 
loyalties were shifted to Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al Sistani of Iraq.
187
  Despite the 
fact that Dawah distinguishes its doctrine as separate from that of Ayatollah Khamenei, the 
bonds between the party and the IRGC are still strong.  Dawah has a militant wing but has had 
little activity apart from 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait, which it 
claimed responsibility for.
188
 The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq‘s militant 
wing, the Badr Corps, has a stronger presence within Iraq and is the progeny of the IRGC‘s Quds 
Force.  
Much of the intelligence that is available on the Badr Corps and Quds Force operations in 
Iraq predates the Iraq War, and it is therefore difficult to locate accurate details on the numbers 
of militants, the amount of money that is handled between the Badr Corps and the Quds Force 
and the names of prominent leaders in command.  The primary source of much of the 
information that will follow is a collection of intelligence reports from the Republican Guard that 
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were captured in the course of the Iraq War.  This information was made available by Brian 
Fishman and Joseph Felter on the Harmony Database.     
The tactics and means used to work towards the ideological, security and political goals 
of the IRGC depend a great deal on the context in which the Revolutionary Guard is operating 
and the capabilities and resources available to them.  In the case of Lebanon, spreading the 
revolution through military and covert means is essentially a task of sponsoring terrorism against 
the state of Israel.  The best support that the IRGC is able to offer covertly is tangible support 
and training.  Tangible support in the form of monetary aid, weapons or medicine are frequently 
transferred through proxies to terrorist or insurgent groups to countries in which the IRGC has an 
interest in nurturing conflict.  Weapons allow insurgent groups to fight for survival while money 
and medicines strategically develop bonds of solidarity between the Iranian-supported insurgents 
and the people that they live and fight with.  
Financial support of local movements takes many forms including supplementing 
political parties‘ campaign funds, paying salaries and recruitment bonuses to militants and 
paying rent or other operational costs for militant groups.
189
  While financial support often comes 
directly from the regime to proxy organizations that support opposition groups and militias, the 
most direct form of support offered by the IRGC abroad is through training.  The IRGC has 
utilized the Quds Force to develop a comprehensive training program in Iran and proxy states 
through which militant leaders are trained and sent back to their countries to hand down expert 
knowledge and skills to their subordinates.    
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The IRGC‘s degree of influence is not uniform in each area of foreign policy; for 
example, the military branch of the IRGC, the Quds Force, may be forced to act in the best 
interests of the state regardless of the institutional goals of the IRGC.  On the other hand, the 
level of individual influence that certain Quds Force leaders have in foreign policy decision 
making may enable them to manipulate the agenda of the ultimate foreign policy executive, 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.   
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 
 
The preceding chapters demonstrate the degree to which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps is integrated into the society, military, economy and politics of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.  The proliferation of the IRGC‘s influence has ignited speculation over whether the Guards 
intend to usurp the rule of the Supreme Leader and the clerics and this debate has intensified in 
recent months with the demonstrated belligerence of President Ahmadinejad towards the 
Supreme Leader.  The speculation is well warranted given the brazen defiance of Iran‘s president 
towards the man who essentially guaranteed Ahmadinejad‘s second term.   
In June of 2009 it was repeatedly asserted by analysts and reporters that Ahmadinejad 
was the Supreme Leader‘s lapdog and his guarantee against the resurgence of the Reformist 
leaders in the Majlis and the office of the president.  By spring of 2010 it was made clear that 
Ahmadinejad‘s relationship with the Supreme Leader was, at the least, not entirely submissive.  
Most recently, President Ahmadinejad was publicly humiliated when he dismissed the country‘s 
Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, only to have the Supreme Leader immediately 
reinstate Moslehi to his position.  Moslehi, a Mullah, was the only cleric in Ahmadinejad‘s 
cabinet of 21 ministers, 12 of which are representatives of the IRGC.
190
  The move was clearly 
an attempt to demonstrate independence from the office of the Supreme Leader and, having 
failed, the president boycotted cabinet meetings for ten days, eventually returning with his tail 
between his legs as a probable lame duck for the remainder of his term in office.
191
   
 
Those who made assertions in 2010 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was on 
its way to  eclipsing the clerical regime are likely surprised to see Ahmadinejad, the public face 
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of the neo-conservative faction of the IRGC, publicly humiliated and subdued by what they 
supposed to be a weakening regime.  The Supreme Leader has more recently shown that he is not 
only willing to put a stop to anyone who steps out of line from his authority, but to take 
preemptive steps towards ensuring that they will never again be in a position of power to attempt 
a mutiny.  It is clear from the events of the past year that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
has a far bigger challenge than initially expected if it does indeed have the unified intention of 
gaining supremacy over the clerics.  In order to be in a place to take that first step, the IRGC 
needs internal unity, autonomy from the regime, and legitimacy with the people they wish to 
rule.  The preceding chapters have attempted to illustrate through descriptive analysis that the 
IRGC does not possess all of these characteristics and that it is, therefore, not in a position to be 
successful in such an attempt.  In summary, the IRGC does maintain a degree of autonomy in its 
military and economic operations and it possesses the legitimacy or the means of bolstering their 
legitimacy with the people.  The association of key leaders does not, however, have the 
conformity of ideology and political objectives to organize a political movement against the 
regime.   
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Table 4 
Qualitative Measurements of Influence 
 
 
Autonomy 
To many, President Ahmadinejad represents the threat of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps and its potential goals to usurp the velayet-e faqih with a nationalist authoritarian 
rule.  While the supposed victory of the Supreme Leader over the President‘s inadequate 
attempts at political autonomy have brought some sighs of relief among conservatives, 
speculation continues to grow as the IRGC proves itself to be capable of securing legitimacy and 
autonomy apart from the clerical regime in both economy and military.  In October of 2011 the 
IRGC went from being a mostly unknown organization in the West to the headlines of prominent 
media outlets with the revelation of a plot by the IRGC‘s own Quds Force to assassinate the 
Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States.  It is not known whether the Supreme Leader, 
who denies accusations, was aware of the plot.  Ayatollah Khamenei cannot very well come out 
and acknowledge the existence of the plot without placing Iran in a precarious position 
diplomatically, but the fact that a plot may have been hatched by the IRGC apart from his 
  Autonomy Legitimacy Unity 
Military 
Original purpose for the 
IRGC 
Guarding and 
continuing the 
Revolution 
Loyalty based on local 
identities and shared 
experiences 
Economy 
Defense, energy and 
construction industry 
monopoly 
Patrimonial networks 
Pragmatic necessity 
only; loyalties based on 
networks  of shared 
identities 
Politics 
Ultimate political 
control still retained by 
the Supreme Leader 
The political credibility 
based on economic 
benefit 
No consistency in 
policy, ideology or 
constituency base 
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approval is equally shocking.  If it was indeed planned without his knowledge, it is another piece 
of evidence that the IRGC has continued to gain military autonomy.  Of equal importance is the 
fact that the IRGC was able to fund the multi-million dollar plot; it illustrates, again, the fact that 
the organization has become an economic establishment in its own right with the financial 
autonomy to execute its own policy apart from the regime of the Supreme Leader.   
Concurrently, some analysts use the example of the June 12
th
 demonstrations in 2009 to 
illustrate the growth of the influence of the IRGC not just in Iranian society, but over the 
Supreme Leader himself.
192
  Ayatollah Khamenei mobilized the IRGC and the Basij forces in 
2009 to suppress the Green Movement, a task that it appears to have succeeded at.  While the 
Guards take their orders from the Supreme Leader, it is likely that Ayatollah Khamenei now 
owes his political survival to the IRGC.  Not only did the Supreme Leader lose some face in light 
of the fact that he had to bribe the IRGC with political and economic influence in order to carry 
out the counter-movement to suppress the protestors, but the world has now seen the light and is 
aware that the IRGC may now hold the key to the survival of the clerical regime.
193
   
It is developments like these that have inspired fears in the Islamic Republic and abroad 
that the country may be on its way to becoming a praetorian state.  Many analysts are simply 
awaiting the death of current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei before declaring the process 
complete.  This perspective does not reflect the complexity of Iranian politics and security; the 
IRGC does not operate in a one-dimensional context in which military prowess and defense 
capabilities are equal to authoritarian control.  The Guards face challenges that are not textbook 
obstacles, but are rather inherent in the traditions and political culture of society.   
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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has, from its early years as an organization, been 
given broad allowances for the control of their own finances and budget.  Following the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war and the appointment of IRGC officials as heads of several bonyads, or 
foundations, the individuals and businesses within the association retained their fiscal autonomy 
and grew in financial independence from the political regime.  The bonyads existed before the 
revolution and were a product of the Pahlavi dynasty, officially intended as a vehicle for 
distributing charitable donations to the poor in the forms of food and energy subsidies.  
Unofficially, the bonyads exist as a means of distributing patronage benefits in exchange for 
political support or other profits.  Since the bonyads were, by nature, autonomous from the 
political regime, the IRGC in fact inherited this economic autonomy instead of taking it.  Again, 
the autonomy enjoyed by the IRGC was not sought and stolen, but rather came about as a 
byproduct of the social and economic context in which they operated.   
Politically, however, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hold very little autonomy 
from the patriarchal regime.  Speculations have been rampant about the potential move for 
independence from the clerics by President Ahmadinejad.  The speculation has been fed plenty 
of fuel with the power plays between the Supreme Leader and the President in 2010 and 2011 
and the use of political appointments as means of exercising influence and, in the case of the 
President, belligerence.  Nevertheless, the success of Ayatollah Khamenei in censuring the 
president is a clear sign that the IRGC has no more political autonomy than any other group or 
individual in Iran.  If there was any doubt as to Khamenei‘s confidence in his ability to maintain 
control over the office of the presidency, the Supreme Leader noted on October 15
th
, 2011, that 
the position of elected president may be abolished and replaced with a premier that is appointed 
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by the Majlis.  The move suggests that the Supreme Leader is not taking his success in 
suppressing Ahmadinejad‘s dissent for granted and may be acting preemptively to prevent 
another power grab by the IRGC during the next elections.   
 
Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of both the IRGC and the Basij Forces is based on cultural support and 
social capital gained accrued as a result of the benefit of the services offered to civilians.  
Traditional institutional theories maintain that legitimacy can be either legally sanctioned or 
morally governed; sociological institutional theory gives allowance for cultural appropriateness 
and acceptance as the source of legitimacy.  The IRGC‘s military credibility can be attributed to 
the fact that the individuals of the organization each belong to networks in society that are built 
on shared experiences and origins.  In many cases, these networks of solidarity were built during 
the Iran-Iraq war and those who fought together on the front lines developed bonds that 
transcend ideology or public policy.  President Ahmadinejad himself often falls back on his years 
as a Basij during the war in order to portray himself as a common man and garner political and 
social support.  At the same time, this innate credibility is bolstered by the social services 
provided by the IRGC and the Basij Forces.  A large part of the IRGC‘s public support base is 
located in the far-flung provinces in Iran; these are the regions that are less privileged and are 
traditionally underserved by public policy and infrastructure development.  The IRGC has built 
respect and trust with these communities by bringing development to their neighborhoods in the 
form of energy, transportation and industry.  The Basij Forces volunteer their labor for these 
projects and at the same time paid positions are created that are staffed by the locals.  The 
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combination of humanitarian assistance work and job production gives the IRGC military 
branches vast amounts of credibility.   
In an economy that depends on networks of patronage at the grass roots, it is especially 
crucial for the IRGC to garner social capital as a means of pursuing its economic goals. Growing 
their social capital involves becoming influential in a vast amount of patronage networks, 
leveraging key personalities and providing immediate economic benefits to those who can 
support the Guards in return either politically or economically.  This means conducting business 
in a manner more closely resembling a mafia or cartel, instead of a free market economy.  
Traditionally, the clerics were the sources of patronage in Iran.  The post-war political climate 
made it possible for the IRGC to supplant the patronage role of the clerics by giving the bonyads, 
or foundations, unfettered freedom.  President Ahmadinejad spurred the IRGC‘s economic 
growth after 2005 by awarding an abundance of no-bid contracts.  The awarding of these no-bid 
contracts reflects the patronage system in a bigger picture and it is the vehicle for achieving any 
political goal in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The bonyads and construction conglomerates that 
the IRGC is in control of are absolutely fundamental to the growth of the institution‘s autonomy 
and control.  They are used to achieve any goals that the institution may have by purchasing the 
social capital needed for legitimacy.    
In the current political landscape in which the Abadgaran coalition monopolizes the 
IRGC presence in the cabinet and legislature, the Guards do hold a degree of legitimacy with 
their constituency.  Their constituency, however, is dominated by the underprivileged and 
Ahmadinejad and his cabinet, knowing this, have aimed the full force of their marketing 
campaign in this direction, leaving the neglecting the middle class.  Since the IRGC does not 
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represent a unified political force, it must be noted that just because the Abadgaran movement 
has credibility among the underprivileged it does not follow that the IRGC has the political 
legitimacy necessary to lead the country.  In order to do so, the IRGC would have to retain the 
features of the political system that Khomeini created, giving the electorate a voice while 
maintaining control over the post important government positions.   The most likely individual 
among IRGC personalities to accomplish this would be Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, not 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Qalibaf has the level-headedness to manage both foreign and domestic 
policy and he has the popular approval to do so without rigging elections or sparking violent 
uprisings.  Qalibaf has the ability to serve the material needs of the underprivileged while 
simultaneously fulfilling the democratic demands of those who are not preoccupied with putting 
food on the table.   
 
Unity 
In the 1990s the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps underwent some organizational 
changes that resulted in a hierarchical structure and a leadership principle built more on military 
professionalism and the tenets of Islam than on identity.  Nevertheless, Basij and IRGC alike are 
often organized regionally and their loyalties are given to their local networks instead of the 
military institution or the Islamic Republic.  In 1994 riots erupted in the city of Qazvin in the 
Qazvin province in northwestern Iran; the IRGC deployed local units to suppress the violence 
but commanders refused to fire on the protesters.  The IRGC was eventually forced to bring in 
units from other regions in order to quell the protests.  The event demonstrated the 
fractionalization of the IRGC at the military level, even among commanders, and raises 
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questions as to whether the higher-echelon commanders have the loyalty of their own 
subordinates in a violent struggle against the regime, if it ever became necessary.  Loyalty 
towards the clerics is often given on the same basis; social identities and networks often trump 
ideological or political goals in the Islamic Republic of Iran and a battle that warranted inter-
territorial violence would leave a lot of speculation as to the outcomes for the regime.  It is 
necessary to postulate that the IRGC as a military organization does not have a monopoly on the 
loyalties of its members and that a military coup, if possible to initiate, would not likely be 
sustainable for a time period long enough to unite the resources of the IRGC into an effective 
resistance against a counter-coup.   
It is important to understand that the factional characteristics of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran‘s leadership, economy and military described in the preceding paragraph are prevalent not 
just among the IRGC, but throughout Iranian society.  The reliance on social networks as 
vehicles of influence reflects the social fabric that makes the Iranian nation unique and its 
political system complex.  In the months following the end of the revolution, Supreme Leader 
Khomeini utilized his own understanding of his culture to construct a political system that 
manipulated the sectarian conflict in order to secure the power of his own position and those of 
his closest allies.  This system closely resembles the informal social networks in Iranian society 
known as dowrehs.  Well-known scholar and author on the state and society of Iran, James Bill, 
explains that dowrehs are the lowest denomination, after the family, of social accountability, 
responsibility and paternalism.
194
  These groups of neighbors can act as vehicles for discussing, 
negotiating or just gossiping about relevant social issues.
195
  The social clubs often share 
 94 
 
membership with other dowrehs or other networks that are based on economic or ideological 
interests.   
Another important feature of Iranian society is the importance placed on key figures in 
religion or politics, such as the Supreme Leader himself.  It closely resembles a multifarious cult 
of personalities with each key personality carrying vast amounts of power and influence simply 
in his name.  In the IRGC, these figures include the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; 
the former commander of the IRGC and current secretary of the Expediency Council Mohsen 
Rezai; Commander of the Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani; and Commander of the IRGC 
Mohammad Ali Jafari. These, among many others, began their careers as revolutionaries and 
rose in the ranks of the IRGC to positions of political and economic influence.  Key personalities 
in Iran and in the IRGC are political by nature, not by ambition to drive their political careers 
forward.
196
  Under and around these influential men gather the various subnetworks of influence, 
those who wish to profit economically or politically from the influence of the leader.   
A study of Iran‘s political and social landscape reveals a system based on a web of 
groups that are unified not necessarily under political or ideological beliefs, but on informal 
networks.
197
  These informal networks can be based on anything from shared experiences to 
patronage relationships; the IRGC represents both.  Competitive disunity between these 
patronage networks has spurred the growth of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but as a 
result of this growth, the original ideology that brought the Guards together in spite of their 
factional differences may no longer strong enough to keep them together.  In the place of 
ideology, economic necessity and social allegiance have dominated as the primary means of 
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ensuring loyalty and cooperation.  This feature encompasses the political, social and economic 
sectors of Iranian society and largely explains the factionalism in each.   
Power centers in Iran are composed of key personalities and are run by networks based 
on relationships between individuals.  While these relationships can be based on politics or 
ideology, they are more frequently based on shared experiences and financial patronage.  The 
web of relationships become networks of influence and the sum of these networks comprise the 
Iranian system.  It is difficult if not impossible to draw an organizational chart, illustrating the 
flow of power and influence in a hierarchical format.  Instead, power is derived from positions of 
influence within one‘s network and the economic or social leverage that that network has in the 
bigger economic or political landscape.  The IRGC is not itself one of these networks; instead, it 
is a larger web comprised of small networks of patronage and shared experiences.  The IRGC 
does not possess the ideological or political unity to control a single party system, much less a 
multi-party political landscape that has all of the accessories of a democracy with the monolithic 
power of an authoritarian dictatorship.   
 
Conclusion 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is, by a matter of fact, referred to as an 
institution.  As such it would be subject to the natural laws governing the evolution of the 
institution.  For example, in Max Weber‘s theory of bureaucratization the IRGC potentially faces 
the same fate of all institutions: as it grows in complexity, spurred by internal competition, 
polarized factions will be forced into moderation in order to retain their legitimacy and will be 
assimilated into a bureaucracy of rules and norms.  As the institution becomes bureaucratized, its 
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functions become increasingly specialized and differentiated.  According to the Huntingtonian 
definition of an institution, the IRGC must prove itself adaptable, independent of control by a 
single interest group, complex in its structure and coherent in its organization. The Guards are 
inarguably adaptable, as they have shown themselves able to assimilate into the economy and 
politics of the Islamic Republic as necessary for their survival.  They are independent of control 
by a single tribe, family or interest group and they are certainly complex in their structure.  The 
Guards are not, however, coherent in their organization.  The sectarian nature of the IRGC could 
arguably preclude the organization from being defined as ―institutionalized‖, and therefore it 
does not necessarily face the fate of moderation and bureaucratization that organizations do as 
they become unified.   
The phase of evolution in which an organization adapts from an association of shared 
interests into an institution is catalyzed by the competition for power and control that goes on 
internally, but as it nears maturity the institution faces either sectarian political ineffectiveness or 
consolidated power and influence.  The military objective the IRGC together is no longer 
sufficient for consolidating the power of the Guards and the competitive disunity that enabled its 
growth into the economic sector is now playing against the IRGC‘s attempts to gain political 
autonomy.  The Guards are simultaneously in a precarious position in which their praetorian hard 
power is officially legitimized by the revolutionary ideology of the clerical regime; the success 
of the IRGC in Iran and abroad depends on the proper balancing of pragmatic and ideological 
interests. 
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APPENDIX B: IRI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
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APPENDIX C: TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
IRGC 
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7/20/1999 Three hard-line newspapers published a letter 
written to President Khatami by Revolutionary 
Guard Commanders criticizing him and holding him 
responsible for recent unrest. 
06/28/2000 Supreme Leader Khamenei Replaces LEF Chief 
Ayatollah Khamenei fired the National Police Chief 
and replaced him with an IRGC Officer, Brigadier 
General Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf 
06/21/2004 IRGC Members arrested eight members of the 
British Royal Navy and seized three vessels in 
Iranian waters that were on their way to Iraq to 
assist with training police forces 
06/17/2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is elected as president of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran with 62% of the vote.   
11/03/2006 The IRGC successfully tested a new missile and an 
IRGC General warned the US to put a stop to 
military posturing in the region. 
05/09/2007 Former IRGC Commander Baqer Qalibaf is 
reelected as mayor of Tehran by a thin margin. 
08/15/2007 The United States blacklists the IRGC as a terrorist 
unit, allowing the US Department of Treasury to 
seize IRGC assets, finances and businesses. 
09/01/2007 Ayatollah Khamenei replaces IRGC commander 
Safavi with the more moderate Mohammad Ali 
Jafari. 
06/12/2009 Iran‘s elections results spark accusations of 
electoral fraud and the Supreme Leader, backing 
Ahmadinejad as the winner, relies on Basij to 
crackdown on rioting in Tehran. 
07/17/2009 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appoints 
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as one of his Vice 
Presidents and is chastised by the Supreme Leader.  
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Mashaei resigns and is appointed by the President 
as his Chief of Staff.  
07/23/2009 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fires Intelligence Minister 
Hojjatal Islam Ghollam Hosssein Mohseni-Ejei who 
was appointed to the position by the Supreme 
Leader. 
04/17/2011 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fires Intelligence Minister 
Heydar Moslehi and the Supreme Leader publicly 
renounces the dismissal and reinstates the minister. 
10/11/2011 A plot is revealed in which IRGC and Quds Force 
members are accused of plotting to assassinate the 
Saudi Ambassador to the United States. 
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APPENDIX D: BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY IRGC PERSONALITIES 
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Qassem Suleimani 
Qassem Suleimani was born March 11, 1957 in the holy city of Qom, Iran.  After earning 
his degree in Management in Tehran, Suleimani joined the IRGC and during the Iran-Iraq War 
and proved himself to be a distinguished leader.  As a green lieutenant he engaged in numerous 
intelligence gathering missions behind Iraqi lines.  Admired for his courage, Suleimani‘s was 
promoted to be the leader of the IRGC‘s 41st Tharallah Division.   After the conclusion of the 
war he became an apprentice of sorts under President Rafsanjani.  In recognition of his talents in 
covert intelligence, Suleimani was fast-tracked to higher leadership positions and eventually 
became the IRGC commander in the southeastern city of Kerman where he was tasked with 
fighting drug smugglers on the Iran-Afghani border.  While acting as commander in Kerman, 
Suleimani was additionally engaged in covert activity in Bosnia and Central Asia.  In 1996, He 
was tasked with heading up a liaison team with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and at that 
time he gained experience in developing and running cells that would prove valuable to his 
career, down the road.  In the year 2000, he was appointed Brigadier General of the Quds Force 
and in 2002 he joined President Khatami on a trip to Kabul to meet with Afghanistan‘s President 
Karzai; it was at this meeting that western intelligence first took notice of this new figure in 
IRGC politics and operations.
198
  
Suleimani developed a strong relationship with Hezbollah and has close ties with leaders 
of the terrorist organization.
199
  When Hezbollah and Israel went to war in 2006, Suleimani was 
deeply involved and was alleged to have been in the Bekaa Valley during the fighting.  In 
addition, Suleimani was took a strong role in Iraq during the US-led war.  Prior to the US 
invasion he was sent into Baghdad to set up a clandestine network to protect Iranian interests 
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after the fall of Hussein.  And following the US invasion Suleimani was influential in supporting 
Al Maliki, who later went on to become prime minister.
200
  Perhaps his greatest achievement was 
a truce negotiation that happened on March 2007 between militants loyal to Shi'a cleric Muqtada 
Al Sadr and the security forces of the Iraqi government.  The ability to halt tense internal conflict 
signifies the amount of power he holds within the inner circles of Iraq.  Suleimani has appeared 
to become an extremely prominent figure with the IRGC, even answering directly to the 
Supreme Leader, Khamenei.  The networks of the Quds Force extend to every country with a 
prominent Muslim population, and Suleimani‘s control of these networks has made him a 
substantial player.  The growth of the Quds Force can largely be attributed to the leadership of 
Qassem Suleimani.   
Ahmad Vahidi 
Before the creation of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics in 1989, the 
IRGC held its own office and command structure. The creation of the MODAFL brought the 
IRGC under its defense umbrella, marginalizing its former institutional autonomy
201
. The 
MODAFL‘s minister oversees all military branches of the IRGC, holding significant political 
and military power.
202
  
Ahmad Vahidi, a member of Ahmadinejad‘s cabinet, was placed on Interpol‘s (the 
international police agency based in Lyon France) ―Most Wanted‖ list in 2007 for ―crimes 
against life and health, hooliganism/vandalism/damage.‖ Vahidi is suspected in involvement of 
the bombing of a seven story Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina on July 18, 
1994
203
. The attack killed 85 people and wounded 200cxxxv. Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia 
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group with close ties to the IRGC (particularly the Qods force), is suspected to have been 
involved. The Qods force is involved in organizing and financing foreign Islamic revolutionary 
movement, including Hezbollah.  
Vahidi was commander of the Qods force during the late 1980s to the early 1990s where 
in 1996 he was suspected of involvement in the attack on the U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi 
Arabia knows as the Khobar Towers
1
. Before acquiring his position as Minister of Defense, 
Vahidi held a position as Deputy Defense Minister, Chairman of the Expediency Council‘s 
Political and Defense Committee, and is also reported as having also served as a former IRGC 
intelligence department chief.  
Mahmud Farhadi 
Mahmud Farhadi is the Brigadier General in charge of the Quds Force‘s Zafar Tactical 
Base located in the city of Karmanshah. The Zafr Base is in charge of operations in the north-
central parts of Iraq and also specializes in shipping weapons, money, and people between the 
Iraqi-Iran borders. Farhadi has been involved in intelligence operations in Iraq for over a decade. 
He was arrested on September 20, 2007 in the Palace Hotel in Soleimanieh, Iraq. It is believed he 
was there with a delegation signing contracts with Kurdish officials in regards to transferring 
goods between their borders. The Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, claimed 
that Farhadi was the deputy governor of Karmanshah who was in the region to develop closer 
economic ties. Mahmud Farhadi was released in 2009 and returned to Iran.  
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